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2ABSTRACT
The Hand That Rocks the Cradle:
A Study of the Comprehensive Chi'ld Development Act of 1971
by
Frederika Randall
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning in
partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of City Planning
In 1971 Congress passed legislation, later vetoed by
President Nixon, that authorized 'an important new public
investment in child care. The Comprehensive Child Devel-
opment Act was a major departure for Congress, in view of
the limited experience of the United States with public
day care. This thesis looks at the process by which Con-
gress approved the child development bill and explores the
interests that proposal reflects.
The important legislative precedents for day care are
considered. Particular attention is paid to the features
of the proposal that distinguish it from past and contem-
porary child care schemes, and to the legislative and
media debate about issues raised by'these provisions. The
political motives of supporters and opponents are explored
and conflicts of values about child rearing and socializa-
tion are outlined. Practical consequences of various pro-
posals and provisions are suggested.
The prospects for future child care legislation are
discussed and issues that are likely to be important in
the future are laid out.
Thesis Supervisor: Robert M. Fogelson
Title: Associate Professor of Urban Studies and Planning
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4INTRODUCTION
Late in 1971 Congress, at the request of President
Nixon, passed a bill to extend OEO for two years. It was
not the routine authorization Nixon had wanted, for the bill,
written by the Democratic opposition, restricted the Presi-
dent's authority to run the poverty program as he saw fit.1
Nixon wanted discretion to cut back certain projects; Con-
gress directed him to maintain specific funding levels for
fifteen different categories of programs. Nixon wanted
authority to transfer projects out of OEO into other depart-
ments; Congress sought to protect the very existence of the
poverty program by maintaining its responsibility to admini-
ster projects.
Nixon had plenty to object to in the OEO extension act,
but when on December 9, 1971 he vetoed it, he devoted most
of his attack to Title V, Comprehensive Child Development
Programs, a separate bill somewhat hastily attached as a
rider:
[Tihis legislation would truly be a long leap into
the dark for the United States Government and the
American people. I must share the view of those of
its supporters who proclaim this to be the most
radical piece of legislation to emerge from the
Ninety-Second Congress.. .for the Federal Government
to plunge headlong financially into supporting
child development would commit the vast moral au-
thority of the National Government to the side of
communal approaches to child rearing over against
the family-centered approach.. .This President, 2
this Government, is unwilling to take that step.
5Even granted the ir.flated rhetoric, Nixon's statement sug-
gests that child development was significant legislation.
Yet most people had never heard of the proposal' before
Nixon's veto message appeared in the newspapers and even
many Congressmen seemed to have little idea what it was all
about.
So Nixon was quite right to point out, as he did else-
where in the statement, that the public had not demanded
child development programs or even considered their merits.
Congress passes much legislation that does not attract pub-
lic attention, but in this case the public ignorance was
significant. Child development was a big new social invest-
ment, a program not only for the poor but for some working
and middle class families as well. And, it dealt with child
rearing and socialization, sensitive. matters for Congress
in terms of public opinion.
Child development was one of several major day care
schemes that had been stirring in Congress since 1969. Much
of the impetus for federal support of day care came from
welfare reform; the Family Assistance Plan included money
for day care but many Congressmen were not satisfied with
its provisions and wanted to enact separate day care legis-
lation. Welfare reform day care was parsimonious; rather
than provide services, it reimbursed eligible women for
their child care expenses. Child development subsidized
services; it covered not only day care but medical, educa-
6tional, psychiatric, social work expenditures, even mater-
nity care and family planning. It was expensive, for it
proposed %o spend government money rather than save it
through welfare reform. And it attempted to make day care
a public service for the use of everyone, rather than a so-
cial service only for the welfare population. While this
intent was considerably compromised in the final version of
the proposal approved by the House/Senate conference, the
supporters of child development continued to regard the bill
as the first step toward universal day care.
Nixon called Title V radical; he was right in the sense
that its passage was a major departure for Congress. It
took years to get Medicare through Congress, and people had
been proposing national health insurance for decades before
that.3 Child development day care was a new idea, yet the
bill passed rather quickly and without arousing much contro-
versy. Further, the initiative for the legislation came
from Congress. So far as I know, no other major social
welfare proposal has been written and passed by Congress
without Executive initiative. The Nixon Administration had
remarkably little to do with shaping child development while
the bill was passing through Congress.
As advocates of children's programs often point out,
federal expenditures for children are extremely stingy com-
pared with expenditures for adults, especially for the el-
derly;4 in this sense too child development was something
7of a break with recent tradition. Both the friends and ene-
mies of the bill argued that it was a radical new venture,
for it proposed that government should be responsible for
young children much more directly and extensively than ever
before. The United States has had comparatively little ex-
perience with day care and there were other ways that govern-
ment might have taken responsibility for children, through
children's allowances or mother's wages for instance. In a
time of budgetary austerity, what prompted Congress to au-
thorize an expansion of government obligation for children?
And what was the appeal of day care among other alternatives?
What other circumstances besides public demand could have
stimulated such a proposal?
Why did Nixon veto the proposal? Both Republicans and
Democrats in Congress were -willing to spend billions on it
and yet the President felt confident in opposing it. (In
retrospect, considering the Administration's determination
to close down OEO, there is some reason to think that Nixon
seized upon child development as the politically safest ele-
ment to attack in the OEO extension act, in order to avoid
submitting to restrictions on his authority over the poverty
program.)5 Nixon apparently felt sure that a vigorous re-
jection of the child care proposal would not hurt him politi-
cally, and since the veto he has become even more certain.6
Since the Administration was committed to day care as part
of welfare reform, why didn't Nixon accept child development
8with the intention of using the day care it authorized to
implement the Family Assistance Plan? Though all the pro-
visions of the legislation may not have been to his liking,
might not the Administration have been selective in carry-
ing out child development programs? We know. that Nixon has
not hesitated to use this strategy in the case of other
Congressional authorizations.
Why did Congress fail to override Nixon's veto? At
least in the Senate child development had succeeded by bet-
ter than a two-third's vote; after the veto it could muster
only something over half. Why did many of the bill's back-
ers change their minds?
This paper looks at the process by which Congress de-
cided to make a big social investment in child care. The
two features of the Comprehensive Child Development Act that
aroused most controversy were the degree of coverage and the
mechanism of administration. Who should be eligible for day
care? Should it be only for the poor, or for everyone? And
where should control of programs lie? What agencies or
levels of government should have authority to plan, fund and
supervise child care projects? In debate about these two is-
sues, the Nixon Administration and the supporters of child
development reveal political motives that go beyond questions
involved in day care.
My aim is first of all to tell the story of the passage
of the child development bill, and to assess the significance
9of its provisions, in view of past day care experience and
in view of current Congressional politics. Other than short
and usually superficial accounts which have appeared in the
popular media, no such discussion exists, so far as I know.
Although I have not made recommendations for child care
policy, I have tried to reveal what issues are likely to be
important in any future legislation.. I have suggested prac-
tical consequences of the provisions of the child development
bill, and compared them with the consequences of other day
care proposals. A study of the politics of child development
also has something to say about Congressional and party poli-
tics as they bear on the provision of social services. And
the legislative process brings to light conflicts of values
about the family and child rearing that are likely to persist
and continue to affect Congressional decisions about child
care.
A study of legislation also has limitations, for certain
issues and interests may be concealed or may simply be part
of the background, evident only in the limits of debate. For
instance, a number of people who write about child care point
to the importance of the economic system and economic inter-
ests in shaping what services government will provide, and
for whom, and also in shaping what people think about the
family and about government's responsibility in child care.7
Although I have not dealt with those questions here, I have
10
tried to bear in mind that the whole story does not lie on
the surface of Concessional debate.
11
CHAPTER ONE
PUBLIC DAY CARE BEFORE 1971
Most of the literature on child care is written by ad-
ministrators and professionals, who tend to see public day
care in context of a progressive accumulation of knowledge
of, and interest in, child rearing and child care. In this
view, as knowledge about the development of children has be-
come more specialized, government has progressively taken on
more and more responsibility for children. Child develop-
ment programs are a logical extension of that responsibili-
ty. This view emphasizes the development of policy ideas
and tends to make light of discontinuities.
Looking back over the past century however, the strik-
ing thing is how little direct responsibility for young child-
ren government has taken on. Day care of children has de-
cidedly been the exception. Government has not taken on
special obligations for the health, education or socializa-
tion of most pre-school age children. And many people de-
fend this situation, arguing that child care has been and
should be the responsibility of parents and the family, and
that government ought not to interfere in this private sphere.
While child care has mcqtly been left to the family,
indirectly, government influences child rearing, by enforcing
the responsibility of the family to care for and bring up
children. The obligations of parents are governed by law.2
12
And, as it is evident that economic forces shape. families,
government, in maintaining and enforcing certain economic
policies, affects how children arc brought up in their fami-
lies. It is sometimes argued that there is a danger, es-
pecially for the poor, in public child care, that parents
will have to give control of their children over to profes-
sionals or to government.3 While this is a real concern,
it is important to recognize that a laissez faire government
child rearing policy does not leave parents entirely free
to bring up their children any way they wish. If parents
do not have money to pay for medical care, nursery school,
or even just for a babysitter, then they have very little to
say about how their children are brought up.
While as a rule government has stayed out of the busi-
ness of providing child care, there was one major exception
to this policy: during World War II the federal government
subsidized day nurseries for the children of women working
in war industries. Other than that, past day care movements
have been unsuccessful. From time to time middle class and
professional groups have tried to set up public child care
centers for the poor; they have usually justified their aims
by arguing that the poor do such a bad job of child rearing
that the public must intervene. But while this point of
view is persistent, on the wholer these groups have not been
very successful in bringing about public child care. I
13
think it can be said that they have only been suocessful when
there were compelling other reasons for government to set
up day nurseries, such as the demand for female labor during
World War II.
What I want to emphasize is that the child development
bill is an anomaly in light of the prevailing government poli-
cy over the last century. In turning to the past experience
with child care it is more important to look for the reasons
why day care has not become a public responsibility, than to
emphasize the progressive development of public obligation
for children. Why has the United States not developed pub-
lic day care, unlike many other countries? For what pur-
poses has day care been provided here?
In the late 19th century, wealthy ladies in a number
of cities opened day nurseries for poor unwed and deserted
mothers. These charitable enterprises doubled as lying-in
centers; the mother would come to have her child there and
afterwards leave her baby in the center and go to work as
a wetnurse or domestic servant for upper class families.
The wealthy had a ready supply of servants and the oppor-
tunity to mold the upbringing of the children of the poor.
By the turn of the century, Progressive settlement
house workers had transformed the early nurseries into pro-
fessionalized child rearing centers for the urban immigrant
poor. Settlement house nurseries offered educational in-
14
struction and medical care for the children; they trained
the mothers in housekeeping and sought to direct -them into
domestic work. The settlement house nursery movement flou-
rished around the turn of the century, but after the Pro-
gressives achieved another of their desired reforms, the
mother's pension, the nurseries began to decline. In 1909,
the first White House Conference on Children argued, "Home
life is the highest and finest product of civilization. - It
is the great molding force of mind and body. Children should
not be deprived of it except for urgent and compelling rea-
sons." 5 Accordingly, the Conference recommended mothers'
pensions, so that widows with children would not be forced
into the factories and sweatshops and compelled to neglect
their children.
As Sheila Rothman has pointed out, the coming of the
mother's pension set back the nursery movement.6 Mothers on
relief were supposed to stay at home with their children. As
most states established the pensions, social workers turned
their attention away from "deserving poor" mothers who could
receive relief, toward casework with "problem" families. Ac-
cording to studies of welfare caseloads around 1920, more
than half the recipients of pensions also worked; relief did
not necessarily keep mothers out of the labor force. Never-
theless, social workers lost enthusiasm for the nurseries
with the coming of public relief. So far as I know the only
15
time that government has sponsored both a major relief pro-
gram and a major day nursery program was during, the Depres-
sion, when the WPA supported temporary nursery projects in
order to create jobs for unemployed school teachers. Mothers
of children in WPA nurseries were rarely employed; they were
on relief.8
It would be nice to know more about these fits and
starts of day nursery movements; unfortunately no one has
written that history. Sheila Rothman sees the record of day
care in America as the continuing attempt of elite reformers
to interfere in the lives of the poor, dictating what work
mothers should do and how they should raise their children.
She argues:
It is not clear that day care centers historically
have been an essential mechanism for getting women
into the work force, or that they will become so.
Nor is it true that enlightened change is the theme
of day care developments or that these institutions
will bridge the gap between social classes. Rather,
the history of day care in this country, from its
origins in the 1850's through the events of World
War II, is filled with cautionary tales that scarce-
ly legitimate the kind of inflated rhetoric that we
are now hearing. 9
The lesson of history, it seems, is that- day nursery move-
ments start out with passionate reform expectations and high
moral hopes, but they quickly degenerate. Rothman goes on:
Like so many other social welfare institutions, they
enjoyed a brief spurt of seeming excellence and then
suffered a prolonged lapse into mediocrity or worse.1 0
This interpretation is fine so far as it goes, but it doesn't
really tell us much about why day care has never caught on in
16
America. Why has day care never become institutionalized, as
it has in other countries? Rothman suggests that nursery
movements have failed because they did not live up to the
expectations raised by reform rhetoric. But public schools,
similarly endowed with reform promises, have not lived up
to the promises either and yet are quite a live institution.
This question needs further research; no doubt it could be
answered by looking at the development of relief and the,
functions that it serves, at patterns of women's employment
and the demand for female labor, and at the development of
the social work profession.
At least this can be said: day care has mostly been a
fringe of social welfare. If anything, government has in-
vested in keeping mothers at home with their children, through
public assistance. Unlike many other countries the United
States government has not taken much of a role either in
promoting women's employment by providing nurseries, or in
providing directly for the education, health care, or sociali-
zation of young children.
With World War II came full employment. Women entered
the labor force in record numbers. In early 1941, about 10
million women were at work outside the home; by early 1944
nearly 17 million were employed and two million more would
go to work before the peak of employment in the fall of that
year. Many of these were married women who took jobs to
17
support their families at a time when the cost of living was
high. Not only did mothers go to work of their own accord;
the industries and the War Manpower Commission promoted fe-
male employment as a patriotic duty.1 2
Some big industries, like Kaiser on the West Coast, and
big cities, like New York, began to set up day care centers,
-and they began to pressure Congress to subsidize them. In
1943 Congress approved the use of Lanham Act funds for day
care centers in war industry areas. The industries wanted
government to subsidize day care to help attract women into
the factories, and because they hoped that women with child
13
care would come to work on time, every day. They wanted,
in other words, an assist from government in increasing pro-
duction and profits; and they got it.
Child welfare professionals and committees of citizens
for children raised another concern: they argued that in a
time of crisis government ought to take responsibility for
children, who might otherwise be neglected while their mothers
worked. 14 In terms of what the Lanham Act provided, it looks
as if this group was not very successful. in pressing its
claims on a national level. Federal day care was run by the
Federal Works Agency, not by the Children's Bureau as those
who spoke for the children wished. Furthermore, federal
subsidy was available only in designated war production;
it was not des.igned to take care of the children of the many
women who did not work in defense industries or defense re-
18
lated jobs. In other words, federal day care was an emer-
gency measure, designed to regulate the labor force parti-
cipation of women in a very speci-ic way.
States and cities also provided day care during the
war. Consider the case of New York City, not a war produc-
tion area and thus not eligible for federal funds, unlike
some upstate cities. As more and more women there went to
work, there grew up an assortment of commercial and infor-
mal child care arrangements. Groups like the Child Welfare
League and the Committee on the Wartime Care of Children, a
task force appointed by Mayor Laguardia, began to publicize
concern for the children of working mothers and press for
aid, arguing that if government did not intervene in child
care, it would have to suffer the consequences of neglect
later, in juvenile delinquency. They persuaded the city
and the state to support child care,,so that the health and
welfare departments could begin to in-spect and license ex-
isting day care arrangements. Settlement houses that ran
day care centers got a subsidy so that they could offer
child care at low fees. The object was to bring existing
child care under professional scrutiny and to provide free
or cheap day care that would compete with the commercial
market. Because New York State got federal money for child
care upstate, much of the state money went to New York City.
After the war most states declined to assume the feder-
al share of the cost of day care. New York State continued
19
its support until early 1947; by that time most of the up-
state centers had closed down, but in New York City, day
15
care was actually expanding. Women were leaving their
war jobs, yet there seemed to be more public demand for day
care in the late 1940's than there had been during the war.
The city and voluntary agencies responsible for child care
had only just begun their work by the war's end, and it was
the settlement houses and the welfare department that ar-
gued hardest for continued public support. Angry parents
went to see Governor Dewey at his home and were turned away
16by police. Women marched with signs saying "day care,
not welfare". Several City Representatives took up the
cause in the Legislature. Upstate, the legislators were
concerned about teenagers and juvenile delinquency.17 For
a while, child care was some-thing of a political issue in
the city, but eventually the politicians abandoned the
cause. Child care remained the province of the welfare de-
partment and the settlement houses, but without more funds
18
they were unable to continue to expand their territory.
At first glance, it might not seem surprising that
public child care did not survive the war. The commonsense
view was that wartime employment of mothers was a temporary
necessity, and that after the crisis, women would go back
home. There would no longer be any need for day care cen-
ters. But although women were turned out of the factories
after the war, married women did not leave the labor force;
20
on the contrary, the numbers of working mothers have stead-
ily increased. Today, eight times as many mothers work
3-9
outside -.e home as did in 1940..
Federal child care came about during World War II be-
cause the industries and others dramatized "need"; they
created a perceived need for the public to look after the
children. After the war they might well have continued to
do so. Most peoplehowever, expected economic recession;
industry, for the most part, had no plans to keep on women
workers after the war.20 Many in the children's lobby had
viewed day care as an expedient all along; the Child Wel-
fare League, for instance, was consistently critical of
conditions in day care centers. Throughout the war, the
League issued cautious appeals for day care, always with a
reminder that day care was a poor second best to mother's
care.21 Whatever the reasons, those~who had been influen-
tial in bringing about government investment in child care
did not push very hard to maintain it after the war. Per-
haps the nurseries were too much a symbol of the disruption
of war; to be done with day care was to be done with some
disturbing changes in the way people led their lives. Cer-
tainly, there was ideological sentiment in favor of getting
the children back in family, out of the hands of government.
Many feared the prophecy of one woman, writing in 1943:
If we free women now from the care of children, it
is like letting the stopper out of a bottle of car-
bonated water. Women will come pouring out of the.
21
house -- permanently -- and will never be satis-
fied to go back home once they get accustomed to a
pay-check, to the satisfaction that comes from
productive work, and above all, if they know their
children can be better cared for by professionals
than by amateurs. 2 2
In fact, "professionals" -- the city and private agencies
who were in charge of wartime day care -- never took over
child rearing; as is evident in the case of New York, these
agencies were not powerful enough in themselves to command
continued government support.
With the temporary exception of wartime, government
has had little part in day care. Relief has by and large
been the strategy for the poor. As for working families,
child care has been whatever people could buy or borrow.
In the 1960's however, the federal goyernment began to spon-
sor several child care programs for the welfare population.
Of these, Work Incentive Program day care and Head Start
were ultimately the most significant, for they represented
the two opposite ways of thinking about child care that
would emerge in the debate about child development in 1971.
In the 1960's, welfare caseloads increased dramatically.
The welfare explosion has been well documented and variously
interpreted;23 the important thing about it in relation to
child care is that most AFDC recipients are women and2 child-
ren. Thus, when administrators began to talk about ways
to reduce or appear to reduce the number of people on re-
lief, day care emerged as a strategy.24 One way to prevent
22
people from getting on the rolls, or to get them off, was
to insist that mothers who had access to any kind of child
care should have to work.
The Work Incentive Program, part of 1967 amendments to
the Social Security Act, marked the beginning of federal
legislative efforts to use child care as a work-enforcer.
WIN created a mechanism to screen out "employable" persons
on the welfare rolls; it was designed to rationalize the
process by which welfare departments took on, and kept on,
AFDC cases. As part of the process, welfare departments
were required to make available a number of "employment-
related" services, one of which was child care.
As originally conceived, WIN put first emphasis on
getting unemployed fathers and teenagers into training for
work. Mothers of young children were least employable in
the WIN scheme; persons responsible for the care of child-
ren for whom an "adequate child care plan" was not availa-
ble, were among those specifically excluded from referral
25to the manpower program.
For a number of reasons WIN was not successful. Most
of the men on welfare turned out to be unemployable. Many
who went into manpower training didn't come out with a job. 2 6
After a year or two of operation, it became obvious that
since most welfare recipients were women, WIN would have
to concentrate on employing women in order to reduce the
welfare rolls. Studies by HEW revealed that lack of child
23
care was the most commonly cited obstacle to participation
in training or work.2 7 As pressure for welfare reform grew,
Congressional critics of welfare expansion seized upon the
lack of child care as the explanation for the failure of
WIN.2 8
Child care had not flourished under the program, large-
ly because the employment of mothers was not at first a
high priority. The legislation required that welfare de-
partments make child care available to women on relief, but
it did not provide for construction of day care centers or
pay the cost of
not only had to
grams; they had
vices, and many
raise the local
departments and
child care was.
14, most adults
program. Often
setting up programs. States and cities
subsidize the full cost of setting up pro-
to cover 25 per cent of payments for ser-
welfare departments claimed they could not
29
share. And WIN left some discretion to
social workers to determine what "adequate"
Potentially, all mothers of children under
on welfare, could be excluded from the work
it was easier to exclude women than to
find both day care and jobs for them.
Cost was at the heart of the problem of work-incentive
child care. If child care were actually to reduce welfare
expenditures, the cost had to be less than the amount paid
out for welfare.30 Welfare departments had no incentive
at all to build day care centers under WIN; no money was
24
provided for construction, and anyway the cost of center day
care can run as hich as $3500 per child per year.31 Exist-
ing day care centers were few and far between in 1967. If
states were really to use child care to reduce welfare costs,
it made sense for them to pay for babysitting by a relative
or neighbor.32 But these arrangements were often unreliable.
And unless welfare-mothers actually got jobs, even the cheap-
est child care was an added expense for states.and cities.
And, there was a good deal of protest, from professionals
and others, both against the use of child care as a work-
enforcer, and especially against the use of what was called
33
cheap "custodial" care.
In the end what happened in New York City was probably
typical. There the Department of Welfare was well aware
that day care centers would not reduce either public expendi-
tures or the number of people on welfare. But as the wel-
fare budget continued to increase, officials made more and
more of the opening of a few day care centers.34 Day care
centers were a symbolic demonstration of concern on the part
of administrators and politicians, about the expanding re-
lief budget and also about the care of little children.
In Congress, 'not everyone was happy to let child care
be a symbolic effort. Conservatives began to dig into the
reasons why the work incentive did not, as they hoped, put
people to work. Liberals began to respond to charges of
25
coercion against WIN and to calls of concern for the child-
ren. When finally the Nixon administration decided to take
up the cause of reforming the welLare system, child care was
bound to be part of what was at issue.
WIN was the precursor of Family Assistance Plan child
care. Child development followed the strategy of Head Start.
Head Start's foundations lie in the poverty program. Among
OEO projects Head Start has had something of a life of its
own, and it has probably been the most popular of anti-
poverty programs, even among those who look with horror upon
the OEO as a whole. Even Nixon, who would like to get rid
of this preschool program, moves with care because of its
popularity.35
Head Start probably owes its popularity to the fact
that unlike other poverty programs it provides a new service,
compensatory preschool education; it does not comDete with
established municipal service preserves -- schools, hospi-
tals.36 As originally conceived however, Head Start was to
do more than provide preschool education.
Head Start was part of a general federal strategy toward
the poor, the instrument of which was the Community Action
Program, a local community agency funded directly by the
federal government which would "mobilize resources" for a
community attack on poverty. What exactly community action
did, and how successful it was, has been thoroughly discussed
37
elsewhere. Unquestionably this strategy did organize the
26
poor, publicize poverty and put demands on government, es-
pecially state and local government. As Francis Piven and
Richard Cloward describe it, the purpose of the strategy,
initiated by President Kennedy and followed up by Johnson
in the "war on poverty", was to force urban government to
give blacks their share of municipal services. The stra-
tegy was to set up federally funded local agencies that
would compete with municipal service agencies controlled by
the Democratic party machine. Piven and Cloward argue that
the result of this strategy was to stimulate welfare expan-
sion, for it was easier for city government to give relief
to blacks than to redistribute services that other groups
in the city had an interest in. As they see the function in
practice of service programs, including Head Start, it was
primarily to organize welfare rights activity and stimulate
expansion of relief.38
Overall, Head Start probably did less welfare rights
organizing than did other poverty programs. (That a child
development day care program modeled on Head Start might have
the function of putting people on relief, rather than getting
them off as in the work-incentive strategy, is however, worth
keeping in mind.) Some Head Start programs did organizing;
the Mississippi Child Development Group was one that did a lot
of "mobilizing resources", and didn't confine itself to pre-
school education. Head Start certainly functioned as an ad-
27
vocate for children and for the poor, and its independence
from local government and strong parent participation gave
39it the means to do so.
Whatever the organizing functions that Head Start may
have served, a lot of people believed that the aim of the
program was to provide services to children, and also that
the purpose of providing services was to change the environ-
ment in which poor children grew up, so that they would no
longer be "disadvantaged" in relation to their middle class
peers. Organizing might get poor children a little more
health care, a little more from the schools, a little more
welfare, but it wasn't going to make their life circumstan-
ces like those of the middle class.
And so many professionals -- who took seriously the
idea that Head Start should turn around the environment of
poverty and who saw environment not in terms of schools or
hospitals, but in terms of how a mother spoke to her child
and whether the child had a father -- developed compensatory
programs that would prepare children for school. Head Start
became a program in which children went to classrooms, at
first for half days, then for the whole day, where increas-
ingly the emphasis- was on "cognitive development". This
definition made the program vulnerable to attack; what pro-
fessionals had created other professionals could evaluate. 40
Indeed, along with Head Start came a whole new field of gov-
ernment sponsored research and demonstration projects, and
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a lot of child development specialists went on the payroll.
But though Head Start came under professional attack,
politicaliy it was popular even at the local level, for so
long as professionals concentrated on preschool education
they did not threaten to redistribute existing services and
thus did not cause trouble for local government.
Outside government auspices, preschool flourished too. 4 1
Increasingly, Head Start became the model for what day care
should be. Labor unions, corporations, factories, private
research groups all ran preschool day care centers. In other
words, by 1969 and 1970, preschool had taken on the character
of a service that government might distribute. Not only who
would get the service, but who would provide it was at stake.
Head Start and WIN were the major legislative precedents
for child care. They represented two opposite kinds of pover-
ty strategies that involved, among other things, child care.
They were not by any means the only federal day care pro-
grams,42 but they represented the two important ways of think-
ing about public child care that would emerge in Congress
in 1971 when child development came up.
In addition to Head Start and WIN, cities and states
embarked on a vast expansion of day care, beginning in 1969
and 1970.43
States began to discover that they could use to their
advantage federal money for social services, provided under
1967 amendments to the Social Security Act, Title IV-A. 4 4
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The appropriation was open-ended and the language was loose:
a 75% federal share was available for social services to
"past and potential" welfare recirients. Under this autho>-
ization, public or private non-profit agencies could set
up day care centers, among other things, and the day care
did not have to be part of a work-incentive scheme.
Between 1968 and 1971 the number of community day care
centers in New York City increased from 99 to 212.45 As a
welfare official there put it, "We were slow to catch on,
but when we did we saw that literally thousands of jobs
could be covered."46 Jobs were not the only thing that
Title IV-A day care offered. Under this appropriation com-
munity groups, parent cooperatives, and women's groups
found a way to run day care centers.47 For some of these
groups, community-controlled day care meant more than just
control over what the day care program would be; they saw
day care centers as a base for community organization.4 8
The idea that some of these radicals wanted to go beyond
running day care centers did not escape the attention of
conservatives in Congress; in New York community-controlled
day care caused a certain amount of trouble for officials. 4 9
But on the whole Lindsay and the Department of Human Resour-
ces suffered the inconvenience, for there were advantages
to them in being able to provide day care centers.
The expansion of day care meant that more and more
states, cities, agencies, professionals, parents, and com-
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munity activists had a stake in federal day care. Simply,
the more day care there was, the more people there were who
had an interest in it.
Finally, professionals and child development special-
ists, whose interest-in the early years of childhood was
helped along by Head Start, got a public hearing in Washing-
ton in 1970, when the White House Conference on Children
was held. Their first recommendation was that.the federal
government establish a national Tprogram of "comprehensive
developmental child care services". Perhaps we should ac-
cept their statement as a sign that Congress was ready to
do something about child care. They put the case for child
development this way:
Economics, divorce, education, cultural values and
other factors have led to a variety of family situ-
ations. The working mother is no longer a "misfit",
and the family is not the simple mother-father-
child picture usually assumed. By the end of this
decade it is possible that most American children
will have working mothers, and there is no reason
to think that these mothers will be less concerned
than other mothers about the care their children
receive, or that their employment will, of itself,
lead to destructive deviations from normal parent-
child relationships.50
Should mothers work? Is it better for children to be
brought up at home, as the first White House Conference recom-
mended, or in day care centers? While professionals debate
these questions, we ought to remember that Congress makes
the decisions. Some observers point to the White House Con-
ference as a key event influencing Congress to approve the
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Comprehensive Child Development Act,51 but I doubt that
professional opinion carried much weight with Congressmen
despite the fact that child development backers often used
the testimony of child specialists to support their case.
Similarly, I disagree with those observers who argue that
the women's liberation movement was responsible for per-
suading the public and Congress that day care was an accep-
table alternative to mother's care.5 2 According to this
view, beginning in the early 1960's middle class women's
groups justified day care as a right for women who wanted
to pursue careers. Officials then turned around and used
their arguments to force welfare mothers to take jobs and
put their children in day care centers. While it is true
that Congressmen and local officials who wanted to justify
reducing the relief rolls often used the rhetoric of the
women's movement,53 they would very likely have found other
ways to get mothers off welfare had not women's movement
arguments come along. And child care was used as a work
enforcer (in WIN) for several years before women's groups
began demanding universal public child care; indeed, groups
like National Organization of Women did not take up the
cause of day care in Congress until early 1971, when the
child development bill was introduced.5 4
Where did the impetus for child development come from,
if not from professionals or middle class women? I have
suggested that welfare reform was one stimulus. And Title
32
IV-A day care and Head Start created a modest constituency
for child care services. In order to explain why child
care was top priority social legislation for Congressional
liberals in 1971, I turn now to an account of the action
in Congress.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE POLITICS OF PASSAGE
In June 1971, Senator Walter Mondale pointed out some-
thing about the child development bill that has come to seem
significant in the two years since:
This is social legislation in a class with Medicare,
yet it is happening without any initiatives from the
executive branch and without much public notice. It's
like spontaneous combustion.
He was right to speak of the bill as significant social
legislation, for its premise was that all children are en-
titled to not only what AFDC is supposed to cover -- food,
shelter, clothing -- but also "a full range of health, edu-
cation and social services" necessary for children to attain
their "full potential".2
To say, as the bill did, that all children are entitled
to such services as a right is certainly to greatly expand
the definition of government obligation to children. This
was not, in other words, just a bill to provide day care
for the children of working mothers, nor was it, like Head
Start, expressly part of a poverty strategy, limited to a
particular population. It is hard to know just what would
have become of child development, had it actually been im-
plemented, but certainly in intent it was something quite
adventurous for Congress.
As Mondale suggests, in the past such legislation has
not come at the'original initiative of Congress. In this
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case the Nixon Administration had little to do with the pro-
posal, not even so much as to clearly oppose it. And it was
not as if Congress took years to daliberate about child de-
velopment; a more modest version of the bill had been con-
sidered in House committee in 1970, but no such proposal
ever reached the floor of the House or Senate before 1971.
In all, the Comprehensive Child Development Act of
1971 passed Congress so quickly and so quietly that most
people probably had no idea what "child development services"
were, let alone what social circumstances these services
were supposed to correct. When New Deal programs were cre-
ated, it was obvious that people were out of work., hungry,
poor. But in 1971, was it obvious, as the child develop-
ment bill stated, that "millions of children are suffering
unnecessary harm from the lack of adequate child development
services"?3 Certainly there was no evidence of public con-
cern about such a situation, except perhaps for that voiced
by the White House Conference. What prompted Congress to
declare such an emergency?
In the 1960's the passage of anti-poverty legislation
presented a similar puzzle. Then, as in 1971 with child de-
velopment, there was no apparent pressure from interest
groups; nor was there evidence of great public concern about
poverty. Moynihan, recognizing that an interest-group poli-
tics explanation seemed inappropriate, argued that it was
intellectuals, professional social scientists, who pushed
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through "great society" programs. He describes a process
of "professionalization of reform", in which social scien-
tists took on an increasing role in' national decision-making
during the 1950's and 60's, and he ascribes the "failure"
of poverty programs to the mistaken ideas of these policy-
makers. 4 A number of people who write about day care im-
plicitly follow this kind of a view, emphasizing the impor-
tance of child development specialists and professionals
in bringing the problems of children to national attention,
and sometimes issuing dark warnings about the dangers of
the "professionalization of child-rearing".5 So far as I
know, no one has actually tried to explain the passage of
the child development bill this way, but it is commonly
asserted that specialists and professionals have a powerful
role in defining the direction of reform. Thus, it might
be argued that a few influential professionals managed to
persuade Congress that a crisis was at hand, and that child
development legislation was the solution. Indeed, a look
at some of the hearings before Mondale's Subcommittee on
Children and Youth would strengthen this impression, for
many of the witnesses were experts on child psychology and
child development. 6
But if it was hard to believe that a few influential
social scientists could be responsible for such a large and
7
enduring effort as the poverty program, it is even harder
to believe that child development legislation could come
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about by a similar process. Such an explanation. might seem
reasonable if child development had come at the initiative
of the Ni-:on Administration. But when has Congress been
known to initiate major legislation, for which there is no
apparent demand and no obvious constituency?
Despite what Mondale says, bills do not come up in Con-
gress by "spontaneous combustion". The child development
bill was very adroitly managed. It appeared at a time when
everyone in Congress was ready to enact day care legisla-
tion. And, as I shall argue later on, it was not by acci-
dent that the Democratic opposition took up child develop-
ment. In many ways the bill amounted to a counter-strategy
to the Nixon Administration's domestic social policy.
For the beginnings of the conflict over child develop-
ment, we have to go back to several proposals first intro-
duced in 1969. In the 91st Congress John Brademas intro-
duced in the House a bill called "The Comprehensive Pre-
school and Child Day Care Act of 1969".8 The bill was re-
ferred to his Subcommittee on Education, which held hear-
ings. Near the end of 1970, the subcommittee reported the
bill to the full Education and Labor Committee, where it
was blocked from further action by representatives of labor
unions and other groups, notably the Washington Research
Project Action Council, a "public interest" lobby. The
lobbyists appealed to Democrats in the full committee, ar-
guing that the Brademas bill gave too much control to the
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states and that local communities should have control of
day care programs. Br'ademas favored the "state-plan" bill
in part because it was acceptable to several Republicans
on the Education and Labor Committee, notably Albert Quie,
John Dellenback and Orval Hansen. From the -beginning,
Brademas believed that it would be impossible to get child
care legislation through the House unless it had the sup-
port of Republicans. This issue of control -- what agen-
cies or levels of government should be designated "prime
sponsors" of child care programs -- would continue to be
a troublesome one for Brademas.
Brademas introduced his 1969 child care bill only five
days after President Nixon made public the details of the
Family Assistance Plan, which included some money for day
care for the children of welfare mothers required to go
to work. The Brademas bill was really the first effort in
Congress to combine compensatory pre-school programs and
day care; it would have created day care programs modeled
on Head Start for essentially the same population as was
included under the Family Assistance Plan. It could have
provided child care for Nixon's welfare reform plan, but
it would have cost a good deal more than Nixon was pre-
pared to spend.9
The original Family Assistance Plan passed the House
in April 1970 and went to the Senate. There the Finance
Committee put welfare reform into a social security bill10
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and Russell Long tacked on as an amendment a bill to create
a federal child care corporation. ConcernEd that lack of
child care might be an impediment to putting mothers to
work, Long devised a self-sufficient corporation, supported
by fees, that would provide day care so as to assure that
welfare mothers everywhere would have access to it. On
the floor, the Child Care Corporation was struck from the
bill by a narrow vote.1 1 (Subsequently, the bill was fili-
bustered by opponents of the welfare reform provisions and
did not come to a vote.)
The Brademas bill and the Long bill were the two major
day care proposals of the 91st Congress. Each was in some
way a response to the likelihood that welfare reform would
require an expansion of day care. In addition, Mondale in-
troduced a bill, "The Head Start Child Development Act of
1969112 which would have expanded the Head Start program.
(The bill was never reported from committee.) The liberals
wanted to protect Head Start; they feared that Nixon wanted
to kill it.
As the 92nd Congress opened, suddenly everyone had a
day care bill; more than thirty separate bills were intro-
duced in the House and Senate in the first few months of
1971. As a labor union lobbyist put it recently:
Day care in the abstract is a little like mother-
hood; everyone's for it. But when you get down to
specifics.. .like delivery systems, then it's a
different story.13
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Ironically enough, day care was an issue a little like mother-
hood, for a time in 1971, and an important group outside of
Congress took advantage of its appeal.
Half of all bills introduced into the House and Senate
are written by lobbyists. 1 Lobbyists do other things be-
sides wr-ite legislation; sometimes they pay for what they
want, in political contributions, sometimes they promise to
deliver votes. Lobbyists also publicize issue.s and legisla-
tion; they get people to write letters and telegrams; they
stir up "grass roots" support and opposition.
Late in 1970, the lobbyists who had blocked the Brade-
mas day care bill got together to write a day care and child
development bill. Brademas, angry about their action in
committee, had said that if they didn't like his bill they
should write their own.15 They realized that children's
programs were something that many of the groups and organi-
zations that lobby in Washington could stand behind; and,
by early 1971 an enormous group of lobbies and special in-
terest groups had assembled to work on child development.
The lobbyist's coalition was not only large, representing
nearly 100 different organizations,16 but diverse; it in-
cluded not only the regulars, like labor unions and civil
rights organizations, who would ordinarily support such
social legislation, but also women's groups, church groups,
professional-organizations, and such strange bedfellows
as National Welfare Rights and the U.S. Conference of
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Mayors.17 Even the governors joined; it looked as if there
might be something in child development for everyone. Not
without a good deal of internal disagreement, the coalition
produced a child development bill. Some of the women's
groups, especially National Organization of -Women, wanted
universal free day care as a right for women. Others, par-
ticularly NWRO and minority group organizations, felt that
the best strategy was to concentrate on services for the
poor and welfare populations, and they wanted strong local
control and parent control provisions. The mayors were
alarmed about community control and the governors hoped
to persuade the others that money should go to the states
and not to localities.18 Not all of these groups actually
participated in drawing up the legislation, but all of
them lobbied for it in soie measure.
The coalition took its proposal to Mondale in the Sen-
ate and Brademas in the House, where the bills were intro-
duced and referred to the Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare and the Committee on Education and Labor, respec-
tively. Mondale had just persuaded Harrison Williams,
chairman of Senate committeeto create a new subcommittee
on Children and Youth, 9 a sign that Mondale, and the
Senate, were prepared to take children's legislation seri-
ously. Joint hearings on child development, before Mon-
dale's subcommittee and Gaylord Nelson's Subcommittee on
Employment, Manpower and Poverty, began in May 1971.
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3rademas began hearings the same week before his- Subcommit-
tee on Education. Despite the evident enthusiasm for child
development in Washington, the legislation attracted little
a-ttention in Congress and little comment in the media.
Mondale took on the hearings with zeal. He heard tes-
ti-mony from the major lobbyists who had written the bill,
frm child development specialists, from sympathetic other
Congressmen, from parents and administrators of Head Start
pro-jects and community day care centers. Almost no one who
testlified was opposed to the provisions of the coalition's
bill. Mondale used the hearings to document a case for the
desperate need for children's services, and he called upon
his friends to present witness. Nobody in the Labor and
Piublic Welfare was especially hostile to the bill. Even
Robert Taft, who would later during the Senate debate of-
fer amendments for the Nixon Administration, came only to
one session of the hearings and asked only a few mild ques-
tions of those testifying.
There was more dissension in the House; there the com-
mittee on Education and Labor had several powerful Repub-
licans, most prominent of whom was Quie, ranking minority
member, who demanded compromises from Brademas in return
for support of the bill. The proposal written by the lob-
byists favored localities; it gave the states little au-
thority over child development programs. Brademas, anxious
to keep the support of both parties, wanted a compromise
42
bill that would favor the states and large cities, and which
would not give authority over programs to small cities or
rural counties.
Testimony in the House committee was more lively than
in the Senate. Bella Abzug and Shirley Chisholm, who had
jointly introduced the biggest child care bill of all 20 -_
a proposal costing $23 billion for three years, with strong-
er local and parent control and more money for working class
and middle class families than the Brademas/Mondale ver-
sion -- sharply criticized the powers that states would
have under the compromise version that Brademas wanted.
Brademas also called on several governors, who not surpris-
ingly, wanted even stronger authority for the states. 21
The same issue that had caused lobbyists to block the
1969 Brademas bill was again causing trouble in the full
Education and Labor Committee. Republicans wanted states
and cities over 500,000 in population to be eligible for
"prime sponsorship"; Brademas got them to agree to include
cities over 100,000 in population. So far as most of the
lobbyists were concerned, this was no compromise at all,
.it was simply another version of a "state-plan" bill.
They wanted what the Mondale version provided: no stipu-
lations on the size of localities eligible to be "prime
sponsors".
Carl Perkins, committee chairman, decided that he, too,
did not like the compromise on sponsorship; he wanted to
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make sure that rural counties, like those in his home state
of Kentucky, would be directly eligible for federal funds.
Perkins' decision to go against Drademas was important not
only because of his power in committee, but also because
his stand carried weight with other Southern Democrats in
the House.
The position of the Nixon Administration seemed un-
clear. Elliot Richardson and others at HEW, notably Edward
Zigler, head of the Office of Child Development, were known
to favor services for children in principle.22 Richardson
twice cancelled scheduled appearances before Brademas' com-
mittee because he could not reach agreement with Nixon and
the Office of Management and Budget. (OMB felt that the
$410 million in new appropriations for day care under the
24Family Assistance Plan was* already extravagant.)
For a while it seemed as if Richardson might be suc-
cessful in negotiating Administration support for some kind
of a child care bill, but in the meantime the official line
from HEW was tough. A letter from Richardson to House com-
mittee and the testimony of Stephen Kurzman, Assistant
Secretary for Legislation of HEW, before Senate committee
make it clear that Nixon did not want a bill with local
control, or strong parent control, or one that would in
any way conflict with the Family Assistance Plan.
Both the Brademas and Mondale bills offered free ser-
vices to all families with incomes below $6,960. The Fami-
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ly Assistance Plan had elaborate restrictions on- child care;
only working mothers who were heads of households, and then
only those making very low incomes,25 were to have free da;
care. And day care could be home care with minimum stan-
dards, and need not include special services.
While the child development hearings were going on,
the Finance Committee was conducting hearings on H.R.1, the
Ways and Means Committee bill which included the Family As-
sistance Plan. Among other things, Russell Long was still
dissatisfied with the bill's-day care provisions. So in
June 1971, Long introduced a new Day Care Corporation bill.2 6
The corporation was the antithesis of child development.
It was run by a three man board appointed by the President;
it offered day care for a fee to all but the very poorest.
Parents had an "observer's" role. The corporation could
contract with any provider of services, and the suggested
standards for child care were lenient. The corporation
would make day care available; it would assure that wel-
fare mothers would go to work.
Because the Finance Committee was holding hearings
on H.R.1, liberals in the Senate Labor and Public Welfare
Committee began to fear that Long's corporation or Family
Assistance Plan day care might come up for a vote before
child development legislation reached the floor.27 Mon-
dale and Gaylord Nelson decided to attach the child care
bill to legislation to extend OEO,28 a bill that was about
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to be reported from committee. Nixon had requested authori-
zation to extend the poverty program for two years; Demo-
crats sought to use this authorization bill to protect vari-
ous programs by specifying funding levels. By restricting
Nixon's ability to transfer out programs into other de-
partments, they hoped to prevent him from closing down the
Office entirely. Along with the child development title,
the OEO bill also had a separate section establishing a,
national legal services corporation.
In the House the Education and Labor Committee was
marking up its OEO bill, also written by the Democrats. 2 9
There, Perkins decided not to report the Brademas child
care bill, but instead to hold it in committee. When the
OEO bill reached a vote on the House floor, he intended to
offer the Mondale child care bill as an amendment. Perkins
wanted to make sure that the House did not vote on the
"state-plan" bill that Brademas wanted. But Quie, who
guessed Perkins' tactic, got a promise from majority leader
Hale Boggs that the OEO bill would not go to conference
before the House voted on the House version of the child
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-development bill. So Perkins had to report the bill from
committee. As reported, the House bill had the following
major provisions:
families with incomes up to $6960 (for a family
of four) were eligible for free services; about
one third of funds under the bill could go toward
providing services for higher income families,
who would pay fees
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- states and cities over 100,000 in population were
eligible to be "prime sponsors" of child develop-
ment programs; that is, to plan, fund, and super-
vise local projects
- on the local level councils of parents would have
control over their own projects
* a variety of different kinds of child care arrange-
ments, as well as medical, social and educational
services were authorized
The major provisions of the Senate bill were much. the same,
with the important exception that there were no population
limitations on prime sponsorship -- cities and counties of
any size, and in some cases, non-profit agencies (such as
CAP's and Head Start projects) were eligible for direct
funding from the federal government.
It is important to remember also the ways in which
child development differed from the other day care propo-
sals then up in Congress.- First of all, child development
had a "services delivery" mechanism that even in the House
version bypassed to some extent state and local government
and the bureaucracies that traditionally ran day care.
Federal money went to (partially elected, partially ap-
pointed) councils at the prime sponsorship level; these
councils in turn approved money for local projects. Sec-
ondly, not only those on welfare, but all families with
incomes below $7000 got free services and higher income
families paid partial fees. Third, the program did not
just create day care centers with community participation.
Child Development Councils were authorized to provide an
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enormous range of services for children as well ;as for their
families. The day care center might be a focus for local
efforts on behalf of children, but day care, in itself, was
a small feature of the bill. The idea behind child develop-
ment was like that of Head Start and CAP: an extra-govern-
mental agency was empowered to push for services on the
local level.
Under H.R.1, the idea was just the opposite: rather
than pay out money to the providers of day care, the govern-
ment provided a subsidy to welfare mothers. Those women
who worked and who needed child care would make their own
arrangements and pay for it themselves; they would then be
reimbursed through a partial earnings disregard. This plan
minimized the government's role in the provision of ser-
vices. Coverage was limited, not only to low income fami-
lies, but to those children of women who actually worked.
Once family income rose above a certain point, subsidy was
cut off.
From the point of view of Russell Long there was only
one thing wrong with this plan; since day care was already
a scarce commodity, women might be prevented from going to
work if they could not find some way of taking care of the
children. Long devised the corporation as a means of as-
suring that there would be just enough child care to go
around. Preferably, day care under welfare reform should
not be expensive; as with WIN, it made no economic sense
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to pay out more fo:: child care than would be saVed in wel-
fare costs. A self-sufficient corporation was one approach
to keeping costs down. Most likely, the corporation would
have stimulated private enterprise day care, for the pri-
vate sector can run day care more cheaply than the public,
so long as standards are not very strict.3 1
HEW was budgeting about $700 per child per year to
provide day care -under the Family Assistance Plan; as of-
ficials admitted, this amount would pay for services com-
parable to child development for only a few children.32 The
Nixon Administration did not want to stimulate expensive
day care, but steps had to be taken to assure that some kind
of child care would be available. The Administration was
looking for ways to cut the cost of day care in 1971; at
HEW officials were looking into private enterprise child
care, and they were working on developing a new job cate-
gory -- a low-paid paraprofessional child care worker --
that could hopefully employ welfare mothers.33 In 1971
HEW also revised the Federal Day Care Requirements, which
had formerly been quite stringent, and had made day care
.expensive.
When child development came to the floor of the House
and Senate, most Congressmen thought of it as a day care
bill, perhaps something a little fancier than the other
proposals. It was not by accident that child development
was thought of' just as a big day care bill; it was a de-
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liberate strategy on the part of the lobbyists and managers
of the bill. 3 5 They knew that Congress was in a mood to
pass day care legislation, so they publicized child devel-
opment as a day care bill. Most legislators were too busy
to read the fine print, and children's programs, like
motherhood, were at heart a dull topic for politicians.
The lobbyists kept publicity on the bill to a minimum; they
avoided the press, so that most people knew nothing about
the bill, and most Congressmen knew only its outlines. The
decision to put child development in the OEO bill was in
part an attempt to keep it quiet. The sponsors hoped that
child development might slip by,3 6 much as Medicaid went
through, attracting little attention, when the Medicare bill
was passed.
Up to a point this strategy was successful. It was
particularly successful in the Senate. The first time any-
one there made a speech against child development was on
September 9, 1971, the day the bill was passed. James
Buckley tried to call attention to the language of the bill
assuring comprehensive services "as a right" to all child-
ren:
This is not mere legislative boilerplate...These
are words and phrases committing Congress and the
American people to a social policy that threatens
to destroy parental authority and the institution
of the family.3 7
Buckley went on, arguing that "innocent-soundina" child de-
velopment programs were "radical" and "revolutionary". Per-
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haps he had cried wolf once too often; in any case no one
seemed to pay too much attention to him.
Robert Taft was the major opponent of the bill's pro-
visions during the Senate floor debate; he offered a series
of amendments that would have limited its coverage and fo-
cussed control of programs with the states. Taft first
tried to have the child development title stricken from
the OEO bill; when he lost this vote, he offered an amend-
ment to limit free services (to leave the judgement on
coverage to the Secretary of'HEW). He also offered amend-
ments to limit prime sponsorship to cities over 100,000,
to limit the policy-making authority of the child develop-
ment councils, (that is, to make the role of the councils
"advisory" rather than give them decision-making powers)
to delete one section of the bill establishing "child ad-
vocacy" projects. All of Taft's amendments were handily
voted down. His final effort, to send back to committee
the entire OEO bill in order to strike off the child de-
velopment title, was defeated by a vote of 46 to 17.
Taft was not successful in demonstrating that these
details of the bill were very significant. Two other Re-
publicans on committee, Jacob Javits and Richard Schweiker,
supported the bill. Taft himself was evidently in favor
of some kind of child development legislation, but the
Administration called upon him to try to limit or kill
Title V. During the debate Taft presented a letter from
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Richardson detailing the amendments that Nixon w.ould require
if child development were to be acceptable.3 8 But the tone
of the letter was curiously vague, perhaps reflecting
Richardson's ambivalence. At any rate the Senate made no
concessions to the Nixon Administration. Buckley, with
the agreement of Nelson and Mondale, offered the.only amend-
ments accepted; his provisions changed the wording of the
bill so as to protect the "moral and legal responsibilities"
of parents.
Buckley was the first person in the extreme right to
catch on to the fact that child development was really more
than a big day care bill. Conservatives finally began to
publicize child development, beginning in September after
the Senate had already passed the OEO bill. At a meeting
of newspaper editors Buckley castigated the press for ig-
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noring such an important piece of legislation. His cause
was taken up by conservatives in the House, who began to
make speeches against the bill and collect letters from
their constituents opposing the legislation. The magazine
Human Events also began to attack the bill and organized
the Emergency Committee for Children, a group of doctors,
ministers and other professionals who began to lobby against
the bill.4 0 The emergence of this lobby meant that con-
servative Congressmen, who had been more or less left alone
by the child development lobby, began to hear about the bill
for the first time.
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The House did not take up the OEO bill until several
weeks after the Senate. Whatever the influence of the con-
servatives, opinion in the House had been more divided all
along. Brademas was criticized from both sides about his
handling of the bill, by Abzug and Chisholm,. and by Quie.
Members of his own committee hinted that the bill was being
railroaded through Congress; they complained that. the hear-
ings had been too brief and that all sides had not been
heard. During the debate, committee Republicans called
attention to the haste with which the bill had been re-
ported and sought to have the bill returned to committee
for further consideration, arguing that such an important
measure deserved the full attention of the Congress. Since
Perkins had only reported the bill a few days before, no
copies of the committee report were available on the floor
and Brademas sought to cover up the dissension in commit-
tee.
In lieu of a report, Brademas offered a set of pre-
pared questions and answers.42 Any Congressman who bothered
to read through this document did not learn anything about
prime sponsorship, the main issue of contention in committee,
for that topic was studiously avoided.
On September 30, Brademas introduced the child de-
velopment bill as an amendment to the OEO extension act.
He sought to downplay the significance of the bill; in
response to a question about how much programs would cost,
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he estimated about $350 million per year.4 ' (WhIle the
House bill did not specify appropriations, the Senate bill,
substantially the same, authorized much more than that sum
for programs in the first year of operation.)44
The fight on the floor was much fiercer than in the
Senate. Over Brademas' objection, Perkins offered an amend-
ment that would permit small cities and counties,above
10 ,000 in population, to be prime sponsors of programs.
Because of Perkins' influence this amendment succeeded.
When Brademas lost this vote the difficulties in his bi-
partisan coalition became evident as Republicans began to
take the child development bill apart, offering a series
of weakening amendments. Quie and Gerald Ford argued that
the effect of a bill that gave free services to so many
people and that had strong local control, would be to ne-
gate the Family Assistance Plan, which the House had al-
ready passed; they predicted that Nixon would certainly
veto any child care legislation which could not be coor-
dinated with the Family Assistance Plan. The only Repub-
lican on committee who spoke up for the bill was Ogden
Reid (who has since become a Democrat) ; much more than in
the Senate the vote split on party lines. After Perkins
got his amendment through, Republicans like Quie, John
Dellenback, and John Erlenborn sought not merely to amend
the bill, but to kill it.
Erlenborn put up an amendment to limit free services.,
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so as to bring the bill in line with the Family Assistance
Plan. Quie read a letter from Richardson, who ,took by now
a firmer stand. "An attempt is being made essentially to
reverse the effect of H.R.l", Richardson said; he warned
the House that Nixon' would not tolerate an attempt to un-
dermine the careful balance of his welfare reform propo-
sal. 4 5 For the first time, Republicans began to suggest
that child development was part of an attempt by liberals
to subvert the Family Assistance ,Plan.
Erlenborn's amendment lost by only two votes. He then
tried to amend the bill so that child development councils
would not have authority over existing day care or day
care under H.R.l. Brademas opposed this amendment as well,
and the House defeated it. But Brademas knew that the
Republicans had almost enough votes.to defeat child devel-
opment and that they were prepared to do so. He there-
fore accepted two weakening amendments offered by Quie that
lessened the powers of local project councils and enhanced
the authority of the states and cities, by striking out a
provision that would have permitted local groups to apply
directly to HEW where local government discriminated against
them.
After a heated debate the House by a vote of 203 to
181 accepted the Brademas bill as an amendment to the OEO
bill. The margin of support came mostly from conservative
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Democrats, who responded to appeals from Perkins and Edith
Green. Quie, Dellenback, Erlenborn and Hansen all voted
against the measure. But Brademas had somewhat undercut
their argument that child development would conflict with
welfare reforms. In his final speech he presented a col-
loquy between Wilbur Mills and himself; in this interchange
Brademas assured Mills that the child development proposal
was in no way intended to conflict with H.R.l.46 Mills,
thus satisfied, was then prepared to vote for the bill.
The House then took up the OEO bill. There was no
doubt that the bill would pass, but much of the debate was
devoted to further attacks on the child development title.
This time Republicans saw their issue: Quie and Erlenborn
began to emphasize that a bill which offered free services
to so many people would cost $20 billion a year. When the
OEO bill came up for a vote, Erlenborn made a motion to
send the whole bill back to committee, with instructions
to amend the child care title so that only the Family As-
sistance Plan population could receive free services. Al-
though this same amendment had been defeated earlier in
the day', this time Erlenborn's motion passed, by nine
votes. So Perkins, in order to get the OEO bill approved,
had to agree to Erlenborn's amendment. Thus amended, the
OEO extension bill passed the House by a vote of 251 to
115; it had, in other words, slightly more than two-thirds
of the vote, enough to override a veto by Nixon. But it
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was clear that the child development secticn could not by
itself command the vote of two-thirds of the House.
At the beginning of October, the OEO extension act
went to conference. While there were a number of differ-
ences between the House and Senate versions of the child
care title, the disagreement that would occupy the confer-
ence for almost two months, was on the issue of income eli-
gibility:. who should be eligible for free services? Per-
kins used his influence to settle the issue of prime spon-
sorship once and for all; he'did not appoint Brademas to
the conference committee. Without Brademas' support,
Erlenborn, Dellenback and Quie, who were appointed, would
be unable to get the "state-plan" bill they wanted.
When the bill went to conference, there was a good
chance that the more liberal Senate version would be up-
held and that the liberals and lobbyists would succeed in
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getting almost everything they wanted. They owed their
success in part to their silent strategy; the bill was
complicated and most Congressmen did not see at first glance
that it represented a substantial expansion of public re-
sponsibility for children. Elements of the bill, such as
the extension of coverage to the working class, appealed
to many middle of the road Congressmen. Edith Green made
a compelling argument for equity in services during the
House debate:
So if this (i.e. working class) mother is out work-
57
ing and she has two or three children entirely de-
pendent on her for support, we are going to charge
her to have her children go to a child development
centzr. But if there is another family and they
do not work, we are going to make it free for them.
I would like to know what kind of justice there is
in this country. May I say that I think it is high
time that this Congress.. .give a little more atten-
tion to the middle-income people in this country
instead of directing all the programs to the low-
est-income groups. 4 9
Similarly, others, such as Perkins, liked the idea that
federal money would go directly to small towns- and rural
counties. The only outright hostility to the bill came
from the extreme right, but conservative opponents did
not have a great deal of influence in Congress. As the
conference opened negotiations, the passage of the Brade-
mas and Mondale bills looked like a triumph for the liber-
als.
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CHAPTER THREE
CONFERENCE NEGOTIATIONS: THE ISSUE OF COVERAGE
On November 29, the House/Senate conference committee
sent the OEO bill back to Congress for final confirmation.
The conference negotiations had been lengthy and child de-
velopment had been particularly troublesome. First the
conference agreed upon an income ceiling for coverage that
was about halfway between the Senate figure of $6960 and
the House figure of $4320. (The language of the House bill
actually left up to the Secretary of HEW the decision about
what families would get free day care; it was assumed that
because of Richardson's insistence on coordinating child
development with the Family Assistance Plan, only that
population would get free services.)
Had not the Nixon Administration taken a firm posi-
tion during the conference, the committee might very like-
ly have chosen to support the Senate version. They com-
promised because Richardson made it clear that Nixon did
not want such a broad extension of free services. But
then Richardson informed the committee that the compromise
plan still did not suit Nixon and that he would certainly
veto such a bill. So the committee finally hit upon a
plan that would guarantee free services only for the Family
Assistance Plan population, but which set fees at a modest
level for families with incomes up to $6960. The liberals
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regarded thisas a generous compromise with the Administra-
tion and many supporters of the bill were d.ismayed, feel-
ing that the committee had gone Loo far.
In many ways the most novel feature of the child de-
velopment proposal was the degree of coverage. In the past,
day care has always been provided selectively, for special
children and in special circumstances. Family Assistance
Plan day care was selective, provided for the special pur-
pose of putting welfare mothers to work. Quite the oppo-
site, the Comprehensive Child Development Act was called,
in its preamble, the legislative framework for universal
services. The extension of coverage to others besides the
welfare population was an important article for the sup-
porters of the child development bill; it was also one of
the features of the bill that the Nixon Administration
most opposed. What was at stake? Why, in conference ne-
gotiations, was Richardson so adamant on this point? What
difference did the issue of coverage make to the supporters
of child development?
In order to see how profound was the disagreement on
this point, it is worthwhile to go back to the beginnings
of the bill, to the lobbyists who first drew it up. Crit-
ics of child development have argued that the reason the
proposal went beyond providing day care just for welfare
mothers was that women's groups leaned on Congress to get
government sponsored day care as a right for middle class
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women:
The day care proposal was propelled through Congress
chiefly as a response to women's liberation, and its
desire to free women from some of the day long bur-
dens of child care.. .with its support from the afflu-
ent it is not surprising that under the bill, day
care would be available to everyone.2
Opponents saw this as a frivolous aim. They argued that
National Organization of Women and National Women's Politi-
cal Caucus represented an elite minority, and that in seek-
ing to get day care for themselves, they would force the
poor into day care centers against their will and against
their best interests.3 But the child development bill did
not provide universal day care; from the point of view of
women's groups it was a very small step toward that goal. 4
It would be wrong to over-emphasize the influence of middle
class women's groups, for I think they had relatively lit-
tle success in pressing their demands in Congress. Not on-
ly women's groups but most all of the other interest groups
behind child development supported the extension of cover-
age to working and middle class families. To see why, we
have to look to the general legislative aims of the pover-
ty, civil rights and labor lobbyists who pushed the child
care proposal through Congress.
First of all, they developed their proposal in re-
sponse to welfare reform day care. Supporters of child
development felt that child care should not be thought of
simply as a work incentive for mothers on welfare, and
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they believed that the Family Assistance Plan did not put
sufficient emphasis on the welfare of children. They
pointed to the minimum funding under H.R.1 and to the Ways
and Means Committee Report on that bill, which disposed of
the problem of child care in one paragraph:. it stated
that women could not evade registration for work just be-
cause they were dissatisfied with the arrangement.availa-
ble for the care of their children.5 Some of the lobby-
ists who supported child development were opposed outright
to the Family Assistance Plan,6 but many were not, and most
liberals in Congress were not wholely opposed either. They
simply wanted to enforce an emphasis on the welfare of child-
ren in any day care legislation.
Kenneth Young, legislative representative for the
AFL-CIO, was one of many who argued that it was necessary
to def.end children from the excesses of welfare reform:
Far too many people.. .are demanding that the mother
get off the welfare roll -- even when it means the
minimum of custodial care, or no care at all for
her children. The AFL-CIO is convinced, Mr. Chair-
man, that such a policy is disastrous. These child-
ren of the poor are already disadvantaged. To fur-
ther deprive them of opportunity in their most for-
mative years is to make them doubly disadvantaged.
If these children spend their early years neglected
in a back room or left to roam the streets unat-
tended, the next generation will face 3roblems much
more severe than the costs of welfare.
Others were prepared to carry this sentiment further. "Tak-
ing care of a murderer in our society takes care of $18,000
per year per murderer," one expert put it, in an attempt
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to illustrate the costs and benefits of a generous child
care program.8 It was easy to argue that covernment should
not scrimp and save on child care for the poor. It would
seem that the obvious strategy to protect children would
have been to try to amend H.R.l. But liberals were not
really in a position to force compromises on that bill. 9
And so they sought to pass separate legislation.
The model for child development was Head Start, and
in part the aim of the legislation was to protect the Head
10
Start program. The Nixon Administration was not enthusi-
astic about that program; each year since Nixon had taken
office he had requested a little less money for it. For
several reasons those who favored child development pro-
grams decided that it would be a good idea to expand on
Head Start and create a program that would include not on-
ly the poor, but working and middle -class families. First,
this strategy helped to satisfy the women's groups who were
demanding universal day care. NOW, for instance, took the
position that socioeconomic integration in child care pro-
grams would improve the quality of services:
(I) t is a mistake on the part of an awful lot of
other kinds of civil rights groups and poverty groups
to try to perpetuate the Head Start, the poverty kind
of program.. .unless we are extremely cautious...we
are going to end up with another poverty program which
is not going to work. 1 2
Arguments for socioeconomic integration on the basis of edu-
cational benefits to children had a certain amount of appeal.
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Mondale was very enthusiastic about this approach, and he
often cited the testimony of professionals, including Zig-
ler of HEW, who followed this line. 13
As the NOW statement suggests, there was some friction
between women's groups and poverty groups, but at the same
time, lobbyists who sought to protect programs for the poor
recognized that extending programs to groups above the poor
might have political advantages. For this reason, more,
than any other, the influential 1.obbyists, especially labor
union representatives, fought hard to extend coverage.
While the lobbyists and liberals often extolled the educa-
tional benefits of socioeconomic integration, what they
usually meant was that programs not for the poor alone would
be easier to get funded and easier to keep funded. An aide
to Mondale put it: "It's pretty easy to keep a financial
lid on programs that deal just-with the poor." 14
In part the strategy was to enlist the support of work-
ing class families in getting services for the poor. As
Shirley Chisholm put it:
All of us are vividly aware of the splits and ten-
sions in this country between the poor and the work-
ing class.. .Let's not aggravate these tensions.
The poor and the working class have the same needs
and the same problems...Do not pit these people
against each other like starving dogs fighting over
the same meager scraps. 15
And as she went on to say, programs for the poor alone are
not very popular. She and others felt that many Congress-
men would be happier spending money on day care if they
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could offer something to working class constituents -- that
was the strategy for getting the bill through Congress.
Once enacted, they hoped that child development programs
would create a constituency for children's services, of
families who came to depend on services, and people and
organizations who provided services, thus keeping pres-
sure on Congress to continue to expand child care.. Pre-
sumably, this coalition of poor and working constituencies
would be even more significant at the local level, in pres-
suring local government to distribute more jobs and ser-
vices to the poor and near poor.
What the child development proposal provided was a
very small step toward universal coverage. But even so,
as opponents pointed out, to extend free coverage to fami-
lies with incomes up to $7-000, with partial fees above
that, meant a program that could end up costing billions
more than day care for welfare mothers alone. I don't
think that there was ever any question that the Nixon Ad-
ministration would tolerate the extension of coverage,
on the grounds of the initial cost alone. Let us see why
Republicans in conference insisted upon limiting coverage
to the Family Assistance Plan population.
According to Taft and Quie, who spoke for the Adminis-
tration, Nixon was concerned above all that child develop-
ment would conflict with welfare reform. This was something
that Richardson too repeatedly stressed: child care legis-
65
lation should work with welfare reform and not against it.
At times they went so far as to suggest that the bill was
a deliberate attempt to foil H.R.l.- Yet many of the lob-
byists and Congressmen behind child care also supported
welfare reform. This was by no means the only thing about
the child development bill which troubled the Administra-
tion, but it was an important issue. Why did Republicans
see the bill as a threat to welfare reform?
Spokesmen for the Administration emphasized that Nix-
on's opposition to the Bradefmas/Mondale bill was largely
tactical: that is, he feared that if Congress passed sepa-
rate day care legislation it would be more difficult to
get H.R.1 through. Thus Clark McGregor, Administration
lobbyist,explained why he sought to defeat child care legis-
lation:
I don't think the President would like a new vehicle
to come along which would stop H.R.1 in its tracks...
H.R.1 was carefully constructed-with each piece mesh-
ing into another and it is the cornerstone of our
domestic legislative program. 1 6
What he meant was that the day care in the welfare reform
plan was included as part of a strategy to get the Family
Assistance Plan through Congress. Nixon probably would
have preferred to find a way to make welfare reform work
without including day care. His aides spoke of day care
as the "sweetener" for liberals in the welfare reform
plan, just as the work requirement was designed to appeal
to conservatives.17
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But Congressional liberals were not very impessed
with welfare reform day care, and took the opposite tac-
tic: they warned that an uncompromising attitude on Nix-
on's part toward their child care legislation would simply
make it more difficult to get welfare reform through Con-
gress. The fact that Nixon signed the 1971 Talmadge work-
18
requirement provision in deference to conservatives,
even though its separate passage presumably to.ok away some
of the appeal of H.R.l, suggests that there were other rea-
sons beyond Congressional tactics that Nixon opposed child
development. It is not at all clear that the President was
ever so enthusiastic about the Family Assistance Plan, and
according to several accounts, the Administration had all
but abandoned welfare reform by late 1971. 19
Nixon's opposition was more than tactical. Child de-
velopment was at odds with H.R.l because it could not be
used to implement the Family Assistance Plan unless sub-
stantially amended. Beyond that, the extension of day care
services did not fit in comfortably with Administration
domestic policy. And in many ways the liberals' child
care plan was directly antagonistic to that policy.
When Republicans argued that coverage for child care
should be left to the discretion of the Secretary of HEW,
so that services could be coordinated with the Family As-
sistance Plan, what exactly did they mean? First, if free
services were extended to families above the income sup-
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plement cutoff point, the carefully worked out graduated
supplementation scheme would be jeopardized. If day care
were free to families with incomes up to $7000 per year,
it meant that the poor could not be made to assume the
cost of their own child care once their incomes rose above
the cutoff point. Day care could not function as a work-
incentive benefit for the very poor if it were also made
free to the near poor. Just this sort of problem with the
welfare reform scheme had already caught the attention of
conservatives in the Finance Committee,20 and the Adminis-
tration was by now alert to all the snags and pitfalls in
the work incentive.
Republicans also argued that a limited program would
better serve the poor. First, they said, the extension of
services would make the program cost too much, more than
Nixon would be willing to spend. Secondly, since it was
unlikely that the program would get full funding, it was
best to try to serve the very poor, who needed services
most. Richardson argued for the limitation of coverage
in a letter to Gerald Ford:
If left unamended and enacted into law, this will
be another tragically unfulfillable commitment to
the American people of a type which has already so
undermined public confidence in our governmental
system.21
He meant that government should not promise what it could
not deliver. Implicit in this argument was the recognition
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that the Brademas/Mondale bill might create an ehormous
demand for child care and children's services, just as I
have argued its supporters hoped it would. Republicans
were arguing that Nixon did not want to stimulate such de-
mand, nor was he willing to spend so much money.
The Administration position on free services should
not have been surprising, for it followed from Nixon's gen-
eral aim to cut back on federal spending, especially for
welfare and social services. According to Moynihan, who
was present at the creation 6f the Family Assistance Plan,
the President had come to believe that the poverty program
and other service programs were ineffective in reducing
welfare dependency. Moynihan urged Nixon to adopt an "in-
come strategy" -- that is to redistribute money directly,
rather than seek to reduce welfare circuitously, through
the provision of social services. Thus, Moynihan says,
Nixon began to see how a guaranteed annual income could be
superior to a program like Head Start as social policy for
children:
This (i.e. 1969) was a curious time in government.
A sense of the limits of social policy, as of foreign
policy, was making itself felt in the aftermath of
substantial failures. At this time, for example, the
relative lack of success of the comoensatory educa-
tion programs of the nineteen-sixties was being re-
ported from the field with ever greater insistence.
The issue of compensatory education, in fact, arose
early in the new Administration, and influenced the
adoption of FAP. It was an issue as closely con-
nected as any could be to the achievement of racial
equality, the minimization of social class differ-
ences, and a general relaxation of the wrenching
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social tensions of the time. 2 2
Whether or not the Nixon Administration saw. things
quite in the way that Moynihan did,2 3 at least one part of
this argument was appealing: service programs that didn't
work should be cut out. There were plenty of evaluations
that showed that various OEO and HEW social services pro-
grams for the poor did not achieve their goals. The ex-
perts merely provided the rationale; the cours-e of action
was already one that Nixon was sympathetic to, for the
programs in question were mostly creations of the Demo-
cratic party and had a Democratic constituency. By 1971,
Nixon had begun the process of cutting back on federal pro-
grams for the urban poor.
I do not want to suggest that the above is a full in-
terpretation of Nixon's domestic policy, for that would re-
quire an analysis of revenue sharing and income maintenance
and lead far afield from the problem of day care. Here I
am simply concerned with one facet of Administration poli-
cy: the decision to cut back on federal spending for so-
cial services and to eliminate the poverty program. Re-
cent efforts by the Administration to close down OEO and
24
to curtail HEW social services make it clear that Nixon
wants to get rid of these programs, with or without special
revenue sharing and income maintenance as alternatives.
In other words, one thing that the President did not
want was a huge new federal outlay for social services, and
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especially not a program that was styled on Head Start and
community action. (I discuss the issues of administration
and control in the next chapter.) The provisions for day
care in H.R.1 demonstrate this quite clearly; there govern-
ment does not provide day care services, but rather those
women who use child care are partially reimbursed for the
cost to them. It is a provision designed to minimize fed-
eral subsidy of services; H.R.l would not have stimulated
new public child care.
Thus the position of the Nixon Administration on the
issue of who should get free child development services was
predictable. Not only would the extension of services have
interfered with the way that the Family Assistance Plan
was supposed to work; it would have reversed the frugal
federal policy on social s'ervice expenditures that Nixon
wanted. And the Administration was well aware that to
take on an obligation to provide services such as the child
development bill authorized might very well have stimulated
public demand for more and more services.
Did Democrats devise the child care proposal inten-
tionally to thwart Nixon's domestic aims? In many ways the
proposal embodied all that the Administration opposed in
social welfare policy. It is important to remember that
child development provided not only day care, but preschool
programs, medical care, psychiatric services, remedial and
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special programs for handicapped children, family planning
and maternity care; in effect it protected a large range
of services f or the poor.
I don't think that child development supporters set
out deliberately to create a program so antithetical to
Nixon's policy or to defeat the intent of the Family As-
sistance Plan.25 But it is well to remember that much of
the impetus for the bill was a response to Administration
policy. Nixon wanted to minimize spending for Head Start;
liberals in Congress responded when Head Start administra-
tors complained about cuts in funds. Similarly, the mayors
and governors, who had come to rely on federal money for
local programs, saw in child development an opportunity
for more fiscal relief.2 6  When Nixon introduced the Family
Assistance Plan, he introduced a proposal that ultimately
threatened jobs in poverty programs and social services.
In Congress in 1971, there was considerable pressure from
professionals and administrators of federal programs who
sought to prevent cutbacks which threatened their jobs and
their programs. Social workers and poverty program direc-
tors condemned the Family Assistance Plan as coercive, as
a scheme to provide cheap labor by forcing welfare mothers
into low-paid jobs. 2 7
It is not surprising that liberals in Congress respond-
ed by embracing child care legislation, for there was some-
thing for most every one of these aggrieved groups in the .
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child development bill. Nor is it surprising that the
liberal lobbies who pushed the bill through Congress were
concerned-about the possibility that the Nixon Administra-
tion would not do justice to a child development program
that was only for the poor. Thus, the extension of ser-
vices to working class families was by no means a frill
in the Brademas/Mondale bill; liberals thought of it as a
very important element in a political strategy, designed
to protect child development programs from Nixon's policy
of fiscal starvation.2 8
If there was any one feature of the child development
bill that provoked right wing opposition it was coverage.
Typically, conservatives exempted the welfare poor in their
defenses of the American family and the rights of parent-
hood; it was the working class and lower middle class they
sought to protect. Because the child development bill was
designed to serve their appointed constituency, it came
in for special abuse.
What made right-wing Congressmen particularly suspi-
cious were references to socioeconomic integration. They
detected a suggestion in the liberals' arguments that the
purpose of the bill was to enhance opportunity for poor
children at the expense of middle America's children.
Perhaps the most persistent critic of the child care pro-
posal was John Rarick of Louisiana, who defended parent-
hood and the family in a speech before the House:
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Mr. Speaker, "the hand that rocks the cradle rules
the nation". Historically, in America as in all
free countries, parental hands have rocked the cra-
dles and people ruled the nation. Conversely, in
totalitarian countries, the government rocked the
cradle and ruled the people dictatorially and mer-
cilessly...We find ourselves confronted with sever-
al legislative proposals seeking to turn control
over the lives of our children in some-measure to
the Federal government. If enacted into law, these
measures would further undermine and lead to fur-
ther deterioration of the family, locally controlled
public school systems, and religious morals. 2 9
Conservatives argued that the proposal was the subver-
sive plan of a professional and administrative elite --
"white-coated bureaucrats" -- who, encouraged by radicals,
sought to create a "new society" using "child control cen-
ters" to socialize the children of middle America. 30 The
conservatives paid attention to the language assuring ser-
vices as a right, and they did not fail to notice the ar-
gument for the extension o-f services to the working class:
that children "learn better" in programs with a socioeco-
nomic mix of families. This was one of the arguments used
to justify integrated schools, and in fact, much of the
right wing attack was really a veiled reference to busing
and forced integration. Conservatives threatened that the
federal government would soon begin forcing children into
day care centers, 3 1 just as the government forced deseg-
regation of schools and instituted busing. "The oppor-
tunity to develop attitudes is what these people are really
after," argued John Ashbrook of the professionals and bu-
reaucrats he said were behind the bill. The threat was
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that parents would no longer have authority to raise their
children in their own way and teach their own values. Ra-
ther, upper middle class professionals, who were sympathecic
to radicals, blacks, and the poor, would take over child-
rearing.32
The outrage of conservatives seems to be off-target,
for the Brademas/Mondale bill did not really create socio-
economic'-ally integrated day care centers, although the
liberals' defense made it seem so.33 But these arguments
paved the way for a more sophisticated right wing attack
on the child development bill, which emphasized the cost
of the program, and the likelihood that the working class
would pay dearly for it through taxes. 34
The right wing, by force of rhetoric, first brought
the bill to attention, at least in Washington. Not only
did they publicize the importance of the bill, they also
dramatized its obscurity. They raised the question of
whether child development was really a popular proposal
and whether people in general really wanted government to
make such a commitment. Columnist James Kilpatrick helped
air the conservatives' opposition in an article written
during the conference. He warned:
This bill contains the seeds for destruction of
Middle America; and if Richard Nixon signs it he
will have forfeited his last frail claim on Mid-
dle America's support.35
This campaign did not get under way until the OEO bill was
already in conference; right wing opponents were too late*
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to prevent Congres s from passing child development so they
appealed to the President, with whom they had substantial
influence. The conference accommodation on coVerage did
not mollify the right wing. Rather the actions of the con-
ference intensified their attack, for they feared that if
Nixon was willing to compromise he might be willing to
sign the bill.
The decision about coverage for child care services
was not the only difference resolved in the House/Senate
conference on the OEO bill, but it was the most important
compromise. Although the decision to limit free services
to the Family Assistance Plan population was a major con-
cession to the Nixon Administration, it was still not quite
what Republicans had tried to get, which was authority for
the Secretary of HEW to set fees for child care at his own
36discretion. Most of the other conference decisions went
to the favor of the liberals. The conference report adopt-
ed the stronger provisions for parent control at the pro-
ject level.3 7
Finally, the conference decided to set the lower limit
for the size of a locality eligible to be a prime sponsor
at 5,000 in population. (The Senate version had no limita-
tion; the House excluded areas under 10,000 in population.)
This limit, and other provisions that weakened the role of
states, meant that the child development program effec-
tively bypassed, the states.
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The OEO bill was passed by both the House and the Sen-
ate in early December. The Administration had lobbied hard
against child development, seeking to have Title V struck
from the bill. The Senate approved the OEO measure by a
vote of 63 to 17; in the House there was another fierce
debate about the child development title, but the bill fi-
nally passed by a margin of about 20 votes.
Coverage was an important issue for Nixon. That the
Administration sought compromise made it appear that Nixon
might sign the child development bill; from most reports
he made up his mind only at the last minute. 38 But I think
it was inevitable that the President would veto child de-
velopment despite the accommodation reached in conference,
for he had other reasons to oppose the bill.
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CHAPTER FOUR
NIXON VETOES THE BILL: ISSUES OF ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL
The conservative campaign did not go unrewarded, for
not only did Nixon reject the child care proposal, he con-
demned it in words that echoed the right wing attack. One
lobbyist called the veto "purely political", meaning that
the President would have vetoed any liberal legislation
that came along just then out of deference to conservatives.
The "political veto" explanation is that Nixon had to pla-
cate conservatives after his trip to China earlier that
year. Others argue that morally, the President found day
care repugnant, that in his heart he agreed with right-wing
opponents of child development. Thus, after all was said
and done in conference, Nixon brought his personal feelings
to bear and decided not to sign. 2
During Nixon's second term as President, it has be-
come obvious that he is prepared to veto any number of
bills, and especially that he will refuse to sign social
legislation when it does not suit his domestic aims.3 But
in 1971, the pattern of conflict between the President and
the Congress over domestic legislation was just beginning
to unfold. Apparently supporters of the child care bill
did not realize right up to the end that Nixon would veto.5
Because his rejection came as something of a surprise, ob-
servers tended to look for idiosyncratic explanations. But
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Nixon's action was perfectly in keeping with the policy of
his administration.
Liberals were stung by the right wing tone of the veto
message, and felt it was a lot of symbolic rigamarole, evad-
ing the "real issues~". 6 But Nixon made it quite clear just
why he opposed the bill:
[Mly conviction [is] that the Federal Government's
role wherever possible should be one of assisting
parents to purchase needed day care services in the
private, open market with Federal involvement in
direct provision of such services kept to an abso-
lute minimum.7
He explained that he was opposed to the direct federal-
local prime sponsorship mechanism "which has made Head
Start so difficult a management problem" and concluded
that this scheme would create administrative confusion,
duplication, and waste. In all, the proposal was "fiscal-
ly irresponsible" and "administratively unworkable". The
rhetorical references to the sanctity of the family aside,
what Nixon was concerned about was the prime sponsorship
mechanism, and the features of local and parent control.
The conference accommodation on coverage had been a vic-
tory for Republicans, but in many ways the prime sponsor-
ship scheme was more of a problem for the Administration
than was the issue of free services.
What was involved was the administration and control
of programs. As approved by the conference, the child
development bill had the following administrative provis-
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ions:
- Any unit of general local government having a popu-
lation of 5,000 or more ancd any Indian tribal or-
ganization, was eligible to be a prime sponsor, a
direct grantee, for a child development program.
- Localities other than states had preference.
- Combinations of localities (not necessarily govern-
mental units) totalling 5,000 in population, and
public and private non-profit agencies (including
community action agencies, Head Start agencies,
community development corporations, labor unions,
educational institutions) could also become prime
sponsors, if no other governmental unit applied
to HEW within a certain period of time, or if the
prime sponsor responsible for their jurisdiction
was "not satisfactorily implementing" programs.
- At the prime sponsorship level, the Child Develop-
ment Council would receive grants from HEW to plan,
fund and implement child development programs. The
Council was composed half of parents of children
served under the program, who were elected, and half
of appointees. One-third of the total membership
had to be "economically disadvantaged" parents.
- The council would contract with local groups to carry
out programs, and preference in applications from
local groups went to ongoing projects. Each project
was supervised by a project policy committee, to be
made up one half of parents, one half of other per-
sons approved by the parent members. 8
Several things about the child development "delivery
system" are worth noting. First, as the Administration
pointed out, there were as many as 7,000 communities, not
counting non-governmental sponsors, eligible to be direct
grantees under the bill.9 Second, there was little for
the states to get out of the bill, for it would have been
very difficult for a state to qualify as a prime sponsor
for all or even most of the projects within its jurisdic-
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tion.10 Third, the Child Development Council, not local
government or traditional service bureaucracies, had con-
trol of funds and decision-making authority. Further,
government could be bypassed entirely and a non-governmen-
tal sponsor approved. Finally, the bill protected exist-
ing Head Start and OEO projects. These were the provis-
ions that the Administration opposed most strenuously, and
I shall explain why below. From the Administration point
of view, the most important, and most objectionable ele-
ments of the "delivery system" were the direct federal-
local funding, and the degree of control over policy that
the Child Development Councils had. Not surprisingly,
these were the features that liberals defended most vigor-
ously, for they believed that the very nature of child care
was at stake. What was the significance of these provis-
ions for liberals in Congress and for lobbyists for the
child development bill?
The liberals felt that child development programs
should be administered close to the community with full
involvement of parents. They argued that it was necessary
to have local control to assure that all local groups would
have access to funds for child care programs. They wanted
parent participation because child care was an intimate
matter that should be dealt with close to the family. But
there was more to it than this.
During the House debate, Shirley Chisholm argued that
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communities of any size should be eligible to be prime spon-
sors:
One of the many things that people have been consis-
tently concerned about is the fact that they have
absolutely no determination or absolutely no voice
over the kinds of programs that will help to make
their lives more wholesome.. .We know that in cer-
tain states of the United States of America some
groups have not been able to get a fair share of
the action from the States. 1 1
The arguments about community self-determination and the
reference to groups excluded by. local government recall com-
munity action. And not coincidentally, for nany child de-
velopment supporters had something very much like that in
mind.
In early 1971 Birch Bayh made a speech in which he
admitted that child development proposals harked back to
community action. He defended the idea behind the poverty
program, arguing that it had never been given a proper
chance to work. It was the kind of speech that puts fel-
low Congressmen to sleep. Bayh talked about "alleviating
powerlessness" among the poor; he quoted Victor Hugo; and
with rhetorical flourish he finished up:
This is my dream -- that our communities shall one
day be healthy, be together, be united -- and it is
my belief that universal concern for children and
families is the best way to begin making that dream
a reality. 12
At the time, Javits and Mondale also made speeches compar-
ing the strategy of their child care proposals to communi-
ty action, but, later on such references disappeared from
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their defenses of child development. In retrospect, it is
worthwhile to look again at Bayh's remarks and others like
them. A number of people took quite seriously the notion
that children's programs could be a focus for organizing
communities.
For instance in testimony before Mondale's committee,
Maurien McKinley, of the Black Child Development Insti-
tute, held that child care could be a strategy to push for
community control for blacks and the poor and she appealed
for even greater parent representation on the Councils.
"Community institutions which control the flow of resour-
ces and the provision of services buttress community power,"
she argued. Such an idea was cause for concern for local
and state officials. In New York City, for instance, there
were several day care centers with parent-controlled boards,
and they fought a constant battle to get money from the
city.13 One observer there pointed out back in 1970 that
these groups wanted more than day care:
These community control leaders are interested in
a whole community organization effort, and they are
really trying to build a power base. They have to
have salaries and many of them are looking for them
in' the Department of Social Services, or any govern-
ment agency that will provide money.. .Their salar-
ies will come out of the day care budgets. 1 4
It is not clear what liberals in Congress thought about
this, for they took care not to talk about it when child
development was being debated in Congress. The mayors and
governors were ambivalent. Although they were opposed to
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strong community control provisions, they wanted- some sort
of child development bill rather badly. Certainly repre-
sentatives of the mayors and governors might have made an
issue of the dangers of community control in their lobby-
ing effort, but they followed the strategy of other lobby-
ists, which was to keep quiet and play down controversial
features of the legislation.
For the mayors and governors the bill meant money --
fiscal relief. The mayors wanted a plan that would fund
cities directly, but they did not like the fact that the
Child Development Council would not be under city control,
nor did they relish having to deal with project committees
15
run by parents. But in the end they reluctantly support-
ed the bill, for they saw that it would at least cover
existing projects whose funds were threatened.16
The governors got least of all-from child development;
while they had some success in modifying local control pro-
visions in the House, their efforts were turned about in
the conference committee. Arch Moore of West Virginia, who
testified before Brademas' committee, was one of several
governors who explained the position of the states. Moore
wanted federal money for children's services very badly;
he argued that state government should be the channel for
money because only the states could properly coordinate
funds to assure their most efficient use. He compared
local control under child development with Head Start, and
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argued that the ef'fort that should be directed to providing
services, not diverted into "power struggles":
FT]o raise expectations so high -- and then be un-
able to deliver (i.e. under Head Start) was a cruel
act, I think, and the rightful roars of anger which
followed this frustration, were I think justified --
even though it was turned to the nearest peopl 7who
looked like government -- the local officials.
Civil rights groups, poverty groups, community activists
were adamant about local sponsorship and parent control,
for they saw child care legislation as a means to get
funds, to provide jobs and to gain a measure of power for
poor urban and rural communities.18 They hoped that com-
munity authority could be used not merely to run parent-
controlled day care centers, but as a lever to get all
kinds of services for communities.
Community activists, mayors, governors, all supported
the bill because it meant, first of all, a new source of
federal funds in a time of fiscal drought. It meant jobs
and services, and not only did officials want control of
jobs and services, they wanted to prevent community groups
from getting their hands on federal money that might be
used to badger local and state government, as had happened
under community action and Head Start.
The leading liberal supporters, and Republican oppo-
nents, of the local and parent control provisions, were
surely well aware of the ways in which the Brademas/Mon-
dale bill resembled the poverty program in administration.
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But I doubt that most in Congress thought much about the
administrative provisions of the bill, again because it
passed as a day care proposal, which seemed harmless enougn.
When the issue of state versus local control came up in
House debate, Carl Perkins and Edith Green took a straight-
forward pork-barrel position, pointing out how few states
had more than one city over 100,000 in population., and
suggesting that it would be unfair to deprive slightly
lesser cities of the benefits of child care programs.19
Very likely, many in Congress didn't think much beyond this
argument.
The Nixon Administration, however, did not fail to see
the significance of the administrative provisions of the
child care bill. First of all, as I suggested in the dis-
cussion of coverage, Nixon wanted to reduce federal spend-
ing for services such as were authorized under the Brade-
mas/Mondale bill. Certainly he did not want to create a
new categorical program of social services. While the
President was willing to spend a certain amount of feder-
al money for day care under H.R.l, he wanted to minimize
the public machinery needed to make those services availa-
ble. The child development bill had as extensive and com-
plicated an administrative structure as could be imagined,
and rather than go through existing governmental channels,
it went around them at every turn. The bill could not be
used to provide day care under II.R.1, and anyway Nixon
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wanted no part of legislation modeled on community action.
From the start Richardson sought to change the local
and parent control features of the Brademas/Mondale bill.
In communications to Brademas and Mondale in June, he pro-
posed that states should be the sole prime sponsors for
programs, with the exception that cities over 500,000 could
be sponsors if they chose. Further, he recommended that
Child Development Councils "work with" officials in devel-
oping plans, and that Councils have authority to review
plans and applications from local projects, but no veto
power over actions of prime sponsor officials. He recom-
mended that the Council be a wholely appointed body with
one-fourth of the total made up of parents representative
of the population served. 20
This plan would have given governors effective con-
trol of child development. The Child Development Council
would have been a committee chosen by the governor, and
it would have had no separate authority. Richardson said,
"It would, of course, have the opportunity to make its
comments public.,21 This was a far cry from the direct
authority granted under the Brademas/Mondale version.
Richardson also proposed that HEW should have a limited
role in setting standards for programs and suggested that
the revised Federal Day Care Requirements, designed for
H.R.l day care should apply.22 The Administration wanted
to give the states more leeway in contracting with pro-
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viders of day care.23
Richardson tr:Led to find a way to bring child develop-
ment programs in line with H.R.l. Republicans in the House
and Senate sought to amend the child care bill according
to his specificatiois. In the end, it appears that Nixon
never wanted child development at all, not even in the ver-
sion that Richardson proposed. In the spring of 1971,
Richardson repeatedly tried to get direction from Nixon on
the legislation; Nixon consulted with the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, thought about it, hesitated, but never,
according to Richardson, said no. And so the Secretary
proceeded as if that meant yes.24 And Congress proceeded
as if Richardson's suggestions were a bargaining position.
Most likely, Nixon did not begin to take the child
development bill seriously until it had already passed the
Senate, when it was too late to begin a lobbying effort to
amend the bill along the lines Richardson proposed. But
I suspect that the President didn't want any part of child
development anyway, and perhaps he was just as happy to
have an excuse to veto the whole OEO extension bill.
The Administration argument against the Brademas/Mon-
dale proposal was based on the principles of managerial
efficiency. In the veto message, Nixon argued that "a new
army of bureaucrats" would be required to monitor the
thousands of projects likely to apply under the bill. He
stressed the duplication and waste of money and effort in
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a federal-local funding plan, and he argued that the way to
improve services was to consolidate administration, to mini-
mize the role of the public sector as a provider, and to
concentrate assistance by limiting services to the welfare
population.
Managerial efficiency and fiscal thrift were the ra-
tionale for his opposition, but the President was. more con-
cerned about the distribution of resources and the politi-
cal consequences of distribution. He spoke of the neces-
sity not to bypass the states, and obliquely, he suggested
that the difficulty with programs modeled on Head Start
was that local groups might use federal funds for purposes
that the Administration, and state government, did not ap-
prove.25 During the final debate in the House on the con-
ference report, Quie, who 'along with Dellenback and Erlen-
born, did not sign the report, threatened Congress with
the consequences of child development:
To me this conference report is an administrative
monstrosity. It is impossible for it to work out
properly. All the problems we saw with the incep-
tion of the Economic Opportunity Act through OEO
are going to be visited on this program and the
way it works.2 6
This was considerably stronger language than Quie had used
during the House debate in September, and the references to
the poverty program had become explicit threats.
Nixon wanted to avoid, at all costs, another poverty
program. Unlike the administrations before him, he did
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not want to extend federal aid to cities ccntrolled by the
Democratic party. As we have seen, his policy of cutting
off aid to OEO projects and social services was causing
special trouble for mayors, who were so desperate not to
lose federal aid that they were willing to forego city
government control over child development programs. The
mayors had come to depend on these programs; they had no
city jobs and services to give to urban blacks, nor could
they afford to continue to expand the welfare rolls.
Instead, Nixon sought tb channel federal money through
revenue sharing and welfare reform to state governments,
many of which were controlled by the Republican party and
by conservative Democrats in the South. 2 7 As several writ-
ers have pointed out,2 8 the Family Assistance Plan's fiscal
benefits would have gone to the South, not to Northern
cities where welfare benefits were already more generous
than H.R.l benefits.
And very likely, Nixon sought to stimulate private
sector preschool and day care.29 In 1971, business was
looking into children's services as a vast new market, and
corporations hoped that the Family Assistance Plan could
be used to subsidize their efforts.30 One conference that
hopeful businessmen attended in 1970 had a workshop called
"Fleecing the Preschool Sheep", a title which aroused a
demonstration of angry parents.31 The liberals were
heartily opposed to franchise and corporate day care, on
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grounds of moral concern for children. "Kentucky Fried
Children" 3 2 was a disturbing idea even to those who did not
as a rule oppose private sector social services!.
Ultimately, what is surprising about the child care
bill is not that the Administration rejected it, but that
it got as far as it did. It was not that child develop-
ment was "radical", in the sense of promoting a revolution
in social and family patterns, as was often claimed. That
interpretation came from the idea that child development
was a day care proposal, whereas, as I have suggested, it
was much more a political strategy to provoke services for
children and families. The significance of administrative
features of the bill and the extension of coverage to
working class families, lay in their potential to provoke
political demand for children's services.
On December 9, Nixon sent the OEO extension bill back
to Congress. The next day the Senate took a vote to over-
ride the veto, and the liberals failed to get the necessary
two-thirds majority.33 Nineteen Republicans who had voted
for passage of the conference report, switched over and
voted to sustain the veto.3 4 Because the bill failed in
the Senate, it did not come to a vote in the House, but
probably it could not have mustered even a majority there.
There was never much chance that Congress could over-
ride the veto once the Nixon Administration made its oppo-
sition clear. During the conference, the Administration
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began to lobby hard against the bill for the first time. 3 5
The combination of Administration and right wing lobbying
efforts against child care had the effect of dramatizing
the significance of the bill, and on the whole the more
Congressmen thought about it, the more uncertain they were.
Apparently some Republicans in the Senate who voted for
final passage did so because they already knew that Nixon
would veto. In the end, child development was a Democrat's
bill, for the President finally made it clear to his party
that he disapproved.
Politically, it was easy for Nixon to reject the child
care bill. One of the things that he emphasized in his
veto message was that the people had not been consulted,
nor was there any apparent popular demand for child care
legislation:
[Such far-reaching national legislation should
not, must not, be enacted in the absence of a great
national debate upon its merit, and broad public
acceptance of its principles...No one, I believe,
would contend that the American people, as a whole,
have determined that this is the direction in which
they desire their government and nation to go. 3 6
He meant that there was no evidence of public support, or
public opposition, for that matter. The lobbyists had not
sought to stir up public support by publicizing the child
care bill; their tactic was just the opposite. Despite
the coming elections and despite legislators' reluctance
to vote aaainst little children, Nixon and the Republi-
cans recognized that they would lose little popular sup-
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port in voting against the measure. Not enough voters knew
about the bill for it to make a difference. Further, when
the time came, lobbyists weren't in a position to generate
the flood of letters from constituents that might have made
the difference. And it is one thing to be able to arouse
support for an established program, in which people have an
interest; it is another to demonstrate public demand for
a new program. Perhaps it is just for that reason that
such legislation as the child care bill does not usually
come at the initiative of Cohgress.
In view of the history, child development was an un-
usual proposal. Government has supported extra-familial
child care only in the exceptional circumstance, as during
World War II. Rather, relief has been the policy for the
care of dependent children. And the Brademas/Mondale bill
was peculiar, too, in view of the usual way that social
welfare policies are determined by national government.
Ordinarily, we expect that reform legislation will be initi-
ated by the Executive.
In order to explain the passage of the child develop-
ment bill, I have argued that much of its appeal lay in its
capacity to distribute jobs and services. Indirectly, the
impetus to create a program of children's services came
from the Nixon Administration. Part of Nixon's aim was
to cut off public support for service programs that had
grown up under the previous Democratic administrations.
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Not surprisingly, -hose who had an interest in these pro-
grams resisted Nixon's strategy. Among child care support-
ers were many who opposed Administration cutbacks, and they
found sympathy among liberals in Congress, especially among
Democrats. In effect, child development was a way to get
back what Nixon sought to take away. I do not mean to sug-
gest that most of the supporters of the child care bill set
out with the intention to design a program that would re-
verse Nixon's strategy, but.only that they came up with
one which would have served that function.
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EPILOGUE
In 1371 Mrs. Richard Nixon es honorary president of
the Day Care and Child Development Council of America, one
of the organizations which lobbied for the Brademas/Hondale
bill. In 1972, she resigned. After Congress sustained
the veto of the bill, Nixon made it clear that he did not
intend to sign any new child development legislation that
Congress might pass, and since then the conflict between
child development supporters and the Nixon Administration
has sharpened. Since his re-election the President has
followed up on his plans to close down the poverty pro-
gram and limit HEW spending for social services. Richard-
son and Zigler, who were thought to be soft on children,
are no longer at HEW and there are no prominent advocates
of children's programs in that department.
In 1972 the Senate passed by a substantial majority a
more modest version of the child development bill.2 Free
services were limited to the Family Assistance Plan popu-
lation and the role of the states was considerably en-
hanced. The House Education and Labor Committee also re-
ported a bill, but no action was taken in the House on
either bill before the adjournment of the 92nd Congress.
The Senate bill, which had the support of Republicans,
reflected the kinds of compromises necessary to get child
care legislation through Congress during the present Ad-
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ministration.. And though the bill had Republican support,
the Nixon Administration lobbied vigorously against it. 3
Now that Congress has defeated the Family Assistance Plan,
I doubt whether Nixon will support any day care legislation.
The experience of the child development bill suggests
some issues that are likely to come up again with future
day care proposals. Any program of the magnitude of child
development will offer substantial federal spoils to be
distributed. Those groups who gain control over program
funds and administration will also gain power to distribute
jobs and services. Thus decisions about child care "de-
livery systems" will be very important.
I have shown how Congressional liberals sought to by-
pass the states in order to get money to groups -- urban
blacks, the rural poor -- who are neglected by state govern-
ment. In turn the Nixon Administration and Republican Con-
gressmen wanted to give control over funds to the states,
thus effectively bypassing poor communities. Because child
development had the potential to become an expensive and
permanent government investment, decisions about administra-
tion and control were particularly important.
Other accounts of the bill's passage look to pressure
from interest groups, such as middle class women or child
specialists, to explain why child development day care was
appealing to Congress. These explanations have little to
say about the political dimensions of the bill's provis-
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ions, and for that reason I think they fail to account for
why liberal Democrats were the main supporters and the Nixon
Administration the main opponent of the child care proposal.
This paper puts particular emphasis on the aims of politi-
cal parties because other writers have ignored that factor.
In other words we should expect to find that future child
care legislation will serve the purposes not only of in-
terest groups, but of political parties.
The prospects that Congress will soon again approve
a child care proposal comparable to the child development
bill look dim. So long as Nixon can count on the support
of Republican Congressmen, it will probably be impossible
to override a Presidential veto, and I think Nixon will
veto any new legislation. Further, the debate over child
development raised some other questions that will make
child care legislation more controversial in the future,
whatever party is in office.
After the defeat of the bill a number of observers
began to raise doubts about public child care as a policy
for children. 4 Wouldn't it be better to pay mothers to
.stay at home to raise children? Wouldn't children's al-
lowances or some form of guaranteed income to families be
preferable? One consequence of the attention focussed on
child care in Congress was to remind people that public
day care might serve other purposes besides providing ser-
vices for children. Fears that child development pro-
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grams might become vehicles for the political purposes of
adults, rather than serve the best interests of children,
led some to argue that a guaranteed income policy would be
better for children.
Without question, a substantial redistribution of in-
come and wealth would serve the welfare of low income child-
ren. But the fate of the Family Assistance Plan suggests
that there is powerful resistance to a guaranteed income
generous enough for people to live on. If the prospects
for child development look poor, the prospects for even a
modest guaranteed income look worse. H.R.l demonstrates
the ironies of a compromise income scheme, which includes
a work requirement along with an income supplement. Con-
trary to the intentions of those who advocate a guaranteed
income so that women can s'tay at home to raise children,5
under H.R.1 welfare mothers would have had to put their
children in day care and go out to work.
Implicit in these doubts raised about child develop-
ment is a notion that authority over child rearing and
socialization is a political matter. Thus Sheila Rothman
opposes public day care on the grounds that it limits the
freedom of the poor to control their own lives and the
lives of their children.6 One of the most important con-
troversies that came out of the debate on child develop-
ment and one that is likely to cause conflict in the fu-
ture centered on this issue of authority over child rearing.
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Conservatives argued that child development- was a plot
by government to take away the authority of parents and
communities to bring up children as they chose. Represen-
tative John Rarick said, "the hand that rocks the cradle
rules the nation" and he meant it not as a sentimental trib-
ute to motherhood, but as a statement about power that ac-
crues from control over child rearing. Those on the left
also saw the issue as one of control; they argued that child
development was a means by which the poor and working class
could gain control over the institutions and circumstances
in which their children grew up.
The liberals responded to conservative attacks by em-
phasizing the strong local and parental control provisions
of their plan, but these arguments did not appease right
wing Congressmen. What concerned conservatives is most
accurately described as an issue of'status rather than
control.
In part, their opposition was designed to maintain a
distinction between working and middle class families and
the poor. Thus they suggested that one of the rewards of
working and middle class status was that government did
not interfere in the family or tell parents how to raise
their children, and they portrayed child development as a
threat to parental authority and to the status implied by
that authority. Conservatives objected to the definition
of public child care as a benefit that government might
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distribute; they sought to depict it as a punishment that
should be reserved for the poor. In defending the respon-
sibilities of parenthood and the privacy of the' family,
they were defending what they regarded as important privi-
leges of working and middle class status.
President Nixon responded directly to this appeal when
he refused "to commit the vast moral authority of the Na-
tional Government to the side of communal appr.oaches to
child rearing over against the family-centered approach." 7
In a practical sense communal as opposed to family child
rearing had little to do with child development, and I
doubt that Nixon thought that it did. The function of his
statement was to confirm the values that conservatives were
defending.
These issues of values will be.persistent, particu-
larly because most people seem to have strong feelings and
firm beliefs about the family and about children. While
values are ordinarily important in politics, they are es-
pecially important where children are concerned, for in
some sense people feel their very survival -- the continuity
.of a family, a community or a race -- is at stake. When
Shirley Chisholm said, "The poor and the working class
have the same needs and the same problems.. .Do not pit
these people against each other like starving dogs fight-
ing over the same meager scraps",8 her words were a call
to battle for conservatives. They will spare no effort
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to prevent a child care program that could unite the inter-
ests of the poor and the working class. In the end, the
issue of who should get free child care will be decided
according to beliefs about family versus government respon-
sibility for children.
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